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Update signing.md to use operatorname

matthew/js-fixes
Richard van der Hoff 2019-11-08 14:11:05 +00:00
parent 0469065855
commit 930c467754
1 changed files with 7 additions and 7 deletions
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14
docs/signing.md
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@ -49,9 +49,9 @@ compromised keys, and sends a pre-key message using a shared secret $`S`$,
where:
```math
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,E_E\right)
S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_E\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_E\right)
```
Eve cannot decrypt the message because she does not have the private parts of
@ -67,9 +67,9 @@ On the other hand, signing the one-time keys leads to a reduction in
deniability. Recall that the shared secret is calculated as follows:
```math
S = ECDH\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
ECDH\left(E_A,E_B\right)
S = \operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,I_B\right)\;\parallel\;
\operatorname{ECDH}\left(E_A,E_B\right)
```
If keys are unsigned, a forger can make up values of $`E_A`$ and
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ a conversation between the two of them, rather than constructed by a forger.
If $`E_B`$ is signed, it is no longer possible to construct arbitrary
transcripts. Given a transcript and Alice and Bob's identity keys, we can now
show that at least one of Alice or Bob was involved in the conversation,
because the ability to calculate $`ECDH\left(I_A,\,E_B\right)`$ requires
because the ability to calculate $`\operatorname{ECDH}\left(I_A,E_B\right)`$ requires
knowledge of the private parts of either $`I_A`$ (proving Alice's
involvement) or $`E_B`$ (proving Bob's involvement, via the
signature). Note that it remains impossible to show that *both* Alice and Bob