44 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
44 lines
1.4 KiB
Diff
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Patch copied from http://w1.fi/security/2015-3/
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From ef566a4d4f74022e1fdb0a2addfe81e6de9f4aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Wed, 29 Apr 2015 02:21:53 +0300
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Subject: [PATCH] AP WMM: Fix integer underflow in WMM Action frame parser
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The length of the WMM Action frame was not properly validated and the
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length of the information elements (int left) could end up being
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negative. This would result in reading significantly past the stack
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buffer while parsing the IEs in ieee802_11_parse_elems() and while doing
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so, resulting in segmentation fault.
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This can result in an invalid frame being used for a denial of service
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attack (hostapd process killed) against an AP with a driver that uses
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hostapd for management frame processing (e.g., all mac80211-based
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drivers).
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Thanks to Kostya Kortchinsky of Google security team for discovering and
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reporting this issue.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/ap/wmm.c | 3 +++
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/src/ap/wmm.c b/src/ap/wmm.c
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index 6d4177c..314e244 100644
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--- a/src/ap/wmm.c
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+++ b/src/ap/wmm.c
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@@ -274,6 +274,9 @@ void hostapd_wmm_action(struct hostapd_data *hapd,
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return;
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}
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+ if (left < 0)
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+ return; /* not a valid WMM Action frame */
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+
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/* extract the tspec info element */
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if (ieee802_11_parse_elems(pos, left, &elems, 1) == ParseFailed) {
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hostapd_logger(hapd, mgmt->sa, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
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--
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1.9.1
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