87 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff
87 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff
|
Try to actively add entropy instead of waiting forever.
|
||
|
|
Fixes <https://bugs.gnu.org/37501>.
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
Taken from upstream:
|
||
|
|
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/patch/?id=50ee7529ec4500c88f8664560770a7a1b65db72b
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
|
||
|
|
index 5d5ea4ce1442..2fda6166c1dd 100644
|
||
|
|
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
|
||
|
|
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
|
||
|
|
@@ -1731,6 +1731,56 @@ void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+/*
|
||
|
|
+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
|
||
|
|
+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
|
||
|
|
+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
|
||
|
|
+ * generating entropy..
|
||
|
|
+ *
|
||
|
|
+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
|
||
|
|
+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
|
||
|
|
+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
|
||
|
|
+ * entropy loop is running.
|
||
|
|
+ *
|
||
|
|
+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
|
||
|
|
+ */
|
||
|
|
+static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
|
||
|
|
+{
|
||
|
|
+ credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
|
||
|
|
+}
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+/*
|
||
|
|
+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
|
||
|
|
+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
|
||
|
|
+ */
|
||
|
|
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
|
||
|
|
+{
|
||
|
|
+ struct {
|
||
|
|
+ unsigned long now;
|
||
|
|
+ struct timer_list timer;
|
||
|
|
+ } stack;
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ stack.now = random_get_entropy();
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
|
||
|
|
+ if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
|
||
|
|
+ return;
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
|
||
|
|
+ while (!crng_ready()) {
|
||
|
|
+ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
|
||
|
|
+ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
|
||
|
|
+ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
|
||
|
|
+ schedule();
|
||
|
|
+ stack.now = random_get_entropy();
|
||
|
|
+ }
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
|
||
|
|
+ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
|
||
|
|
+ mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
|
||
|
|
+}
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
/*
|
||
|
|
* Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
|
||
|
|
* cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
|
||
|
|
@@ -1745,7 +1795,17 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
|
||
|
|
{
|
||
|
|
if (likely(crng_ready()))
|
||
|
|
return 0;
|
||
|
|
- return wait_event_interruptible(crng_init_wait, crng_ready());
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ do {
|
||
|
|
+ int ret;
|
||
|
|
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
|
||
|
|
+ if (ret)
|
||
|
|
+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ try_to_generate_entropy();
|
||
|
|
+ } while (!crng_ready());
|
||
|
|
+
|
||
|
|
+ return 0;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
|
||
|
|
|