gnu: shadow: Update to 4.6.

* gnu/packages/admin.scm (shadow): Update to 4.6.
[source]: Remove upstreamed patch.
* gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove it.

gnu/local.mk

@@ -1087,7 +1087,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =						\
   %D%/packages/patches/scotch-graph-induce-type-64.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/sdl-libx11-1.6.patch			\
   %D%/packages/patches/seq24-rename-mutex.patch			\
-  %D%/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/sharutils-CVE-2018-1000097.patch		\
   %D%/packages/patches/shishi-fix-libgcrypt-detection.patch	\
   %D%/packages/patches/slim-session.patch			\

gnu/packages/admin.scm

@@ -358,16 +358,15 @@ hostname.")
 (define-public shadow
   (package
     (name "shadow")
-    (version "4.5")
+    (version "4.6")
     (source (origin
               (method url-fetch)
               (uri (string-append
                     "https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/"
                     "download/" version "/shadow-" version ".tar.xz"))
-              (patches (search-patches "shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch"))
               (sha256
                (base32
-                "0hdpai78n63l3v3fgr3kkiqzhd0awrpfnnzz4mf7lmxdh61qb37w"))))
+                "10smy01km2bqjjvsd2jz17zvrxbzj89qczyb1amk38j28bcci609"))))
     (build-system gnu-build-system)
     (arguments
      `(;; Assume System V `setpgrp (void)', which is the default on GNU

gnu/packages/patches/shadow-CVE-2018-7169.patch

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2018-7169:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-7169
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0
-
-From fb28c99b8a66ff2605c5cb96abc0a4d975f92de0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
-Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2018 23:49:40 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] newgidmap: enforce setgroups=deny if self-mapping a group
-
-This is necessary to match the kernel-side policy of "self-mapping in a
-user namespace is fine, but you cannot drop groups" -- a policy that was
-created in order to stop user namespaces from allowing trivial privilege
-escalation by dropping supplementary groups that were "blacklisted" from
-certain paths.
-
-This is the simplest fix for the underlying issue, and effectively makes
-it so that unless a user has a valid mapping set in /etc/subgid (which
-only administrators can modify) -- and they are currently trying to use
-that mapping -- then /proc/$pid/setgroups will be set to deny. This
-workaround is only partial, because ideally it should be possible to set
-an "allow_setgroups" or "deny_setgroups" flag in /etc/subgid to allow
-administrators to further restrict newgidmap(1).
-
-We also don't write anything in the "allow" case because "allow" is the
-default, and users may have already written "deny" even if they
-technically are allowed to use setgroups. And we don't write anything if
-the setgroups policy is already "deny".
-
-Ref: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/shadow/+bug/1729357
-Fixes: CVE-2018-7169
-Reported-by: Craig Furman <craig.furman89@gmail.com>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
----
- src/newgidmap.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
-index b1e33513..59a2e75c 100644
---- a/src/newgidmap.c
-+++ b/src/newgidmap.c
-@@ -46,32 +46,37 @@
-  */
- const char *Prog;
- 
--static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range)
-+
-+static bool verify_range(struct passwd *pw, struct map_range *range, bool *allow_setgroups)
- {
- 	/* An empty range is invalid */
- 	if (range->count == 0)
- 		return false;
- 
--	/* Test /etc/subgid */
--	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count))
-+	/* Test /etc/subgid. If the mapping is valid then we allow setgroups. */
-+	if (have_sub_gids(pw->pw_name, range->lower, range->count)) {
-+		*allow_setgroups = true;
- 		return true;
-+	}
- 
--	/* Allow a process to map its own gid */
--	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower))
-+	/* Allow a process to map its own gid. */
-+	if ((range->count == 1) && (pw->pw_gid == range->lower)) {
-+		/* noop -- if setgroups is enabled already we won't disable it. */
- 		return true;
-+	}
- 
- 	return false;
- }
- 
- static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
--	struct map_range *mappings)
-+	struct map_range *mappings, bool *allow_setgroups)
- {
- 	struct map_range *mapping;
- 	int idx;
- 
- 	mapping = mappings;
- 	for (idx = 0; idx < ranges; idx++, mapping++) {
--		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping)) {
-+		if (!verify_range(pw, mapping, allow_setgroups)) {
- 			fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: gid range [%lu-%lu) -> [%lu-%lu) not allowed\n"),
- 				Prog,
- 				mapping->upper,
-@@ -89,6 +94,70 @@ static void usage(void)
- 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
- }
- 
-+void write_setgroups(int proc_dir_fd, bool allow_setgroups)
-+{
-+	int setgroups_fd;
-+	char *policy, policy_buffer[4096];
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Default is "deny", and any "allow" will out-rank a "deny". We don't
-+	 * forcefully write an "allow" here because the process we are writing
-+	 * mappings for may have already set themselves to "deny" (and "allow"
-+	 * is the default anyway). So allow_setgroups == true is a noop.
-+	 */
-+	policy = "deny\n";
-+	if (allow_setgroups)
-+		return;
-+
-+	setgroups_fd = openat(proc_dir_fd, "setgroups", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC);
-+	if (setgroups_fd < 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * If it's an ENOENT then we are on too old a kernel for the setgroups
-+		 * code to exist. Emit a warning and bail on this.
-+		 */
-+		if (ENOENT == errno) {
-+			fprintf(stderr, _("%s: kernel doesn't support setgroups restrictions\n"), Prog);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: couldn't open process setgroups: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Check whether the policy is already what we want. /proc/self/setgroups
-+	 * is write-once, so attempting to write after it's already written to will
-+	 * fail.
-+	 */
-+	if (read(setgroups_fd, policy_buffer, sizeof(policy_buffer)) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to read setgroups: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+	if (!strncmp(policy_buffer, policy, strlen(policy)))
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	/* Write the policy. */
-+	if (lseek(setgroups_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to seek setgroups: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+	if (dprintf(setgroups_fd, "%s", policy) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: failed to setgroups %s policy: %s\n"),
-+			Prog,
-+			policy,
-+			strerror(errno));
-+		exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+	}
-+
-+out:
-+	close(setgroups_fd);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * newgidmap - Set the gid_map for the specified process
-  */
-@@ -103,6 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	struct stat st;
- 	struct passwd *pw;
- 	int written;
-+	bool allow_setgroups = false;
- 
- 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
- 
-@@ -145,7 +215,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- 				(unsigned long) getuid ()));
- 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
- 	}
--	
-+
- 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
- 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
- 		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
-@@ -177,8 +247,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	if (!mappings)
- 		usage();
- 
--	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings);
-+	verify_ranges(pw, ranges, mappings, &allow_setgroups);
- 
-+	write_setgroups(proc_dir_fd, allow_setgroups);
- 	write_mapping(proc_dir_fd, ranges, mappings, "gid_map");
- 	sub_gid_close();
- 
--- 
-2.16.2
-