gnu: qemu: Fix CVE-2017-{5667,5898,5931}.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch, gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu)[source]: Use them.master
Leo Famulari
parent
2c20bf62db
commit
37acc8a07b
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@ -870,7 +870,10 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5552.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5578.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5579.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/quickswitch-fix-dmenu-check.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/rapicorn-isnan.patch \
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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-5667 (sdhci OOB access during multi block SDMA transfer):
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http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/243
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5667
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9
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From 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
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Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
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While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
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'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
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index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
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This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
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to avoid it.
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Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
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Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
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Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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Message-id: 20170130064736.9236-1-ppandit@redhat.com
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Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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---
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hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
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index 01fbf228be..5bd5ab6319 100644
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--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
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+++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
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@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
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boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
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}
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dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
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- &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
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+ &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
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s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
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if (s->data_count == block_size) {
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for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {
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--
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2.11.1
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-5898 (integer overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest):
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http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/328
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5898
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=c7dfbf322595ded4e70b626bf83158a9f3807c6a
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From c7dfbf322595ded4e70b626bf83158a9f3807c6a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 00:52:28 +0530
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Subject: [PATCH] usb: ccid: check ccid apdu length
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CCID device emulator uses Application Protocol Data Units(APDU)
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to exchange command and responses to and from the host.
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The length in these units couldn't be greater than 65536. Add
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check to ensure the same. It'd also avoid potential integer
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overflow in emulated_apdu_from_guest.
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Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
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Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
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Message-id: 20170202192228.10847-1-ppandit@redhat.com
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Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
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---
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hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c | 2 +-
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
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index 89e11b68c4..1325ea1659 100644
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--- a/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
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+++ b/hw/usb/dev-smartcard-reader.c
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@@ -967,7 +967,7 @@ static void ccid_on_apdu_from_guest(USBCCIDState *s, CCID_XferBlock *recv)
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DPRINTF(s, 1, "%s: seq %d, len %d\n", __func__,
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recv->hdr.bSeq, len);
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ccid_add_pending_answer(s, (CCID_Header *)recv);
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- if (s->card) {
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+ if (s->card && len <= BULK_OUT_DATA_SIZE) {
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ccid_card_apdu_from_guest(s->card, recv->abData, len);
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} else {
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DPRINTF(s, D_WARN, "warning: discarded apdu\n");
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--
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2.11.1
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@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
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Fix CVE-2017-5931 (integer overflow in handling virtio-crypto requests):
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http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/337
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https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5931
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Patch copied from upstream source repository:
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http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4
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From a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
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Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:50:03 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: fix possible integer and heap overflow
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Because the 'size_t' type is 4 bytes in 32-bit platform, which
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is the same with 'int'. It's easy to make 'max_len' to zero when
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integer overflow and then cause heap overflow if 'max_len' is zero.
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Using uint_64 instead of size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
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Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
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Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
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Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
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Tested-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
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Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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---
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hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 4 ++--
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
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index 2f2467e859..c23e1ad458 100644
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--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
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+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
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@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
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uint32_t hash_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_hash = 0;
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uint32_t cipher_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_cipher = 0;
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- size_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
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+ uint64_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
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size_t s;
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/* Plain cipher */
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@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
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return NULL;
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}
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- max_len = iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
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+ max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
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if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
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virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
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return NULL;
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--
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2.11.1
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@ -84,7 +84,10 @@
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5552.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5578.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5579.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch"))))
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch"
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"qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch"))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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(arguments
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'(;; Running tests in parallel can occasionally lead to failures, like:
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