gnu: OpenSSL 1.1.0: Fix CVE-2018-{0495,0732}.
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch, gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch: New files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Add them. * gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl-next)[source]: Use them.
This commit is contained in:
Leo Famulari
parent
b8ea0db3ae
commit
9f162c0ab4
|
|
@ -977,6 +977,8 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
|
|||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \
|
||||
%D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch \
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
|
|||
Fix CVE-2018-0495:
|
||||
|
||||
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495
|
||||
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
|
||||
|
||||
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
|
||||
|
||||
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a
|
||||
|
||||
From 0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
|
||||
|
||||
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
|
||||
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
|
||||
|
||||
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
|
||||
|
||||
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
|
||||
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
|
||||
operations.
|
||||
|
||||
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
|
||||
the operation so that:
|
||||
|
||||
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
|
||||
|
||||
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
||||
---
|
||||
CHANGES | 4 +++
|
||||
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
|
||||
2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
|
||||
index 72e2f0f28b..449be0e92a 100644
|
||||
--- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
|
||||
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
|
||||
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
|
||||
EC_KEY *eckey)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ok = 0, i;
|
||||
- BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
|
||||
+ BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *blind = NULL;
|
||||
+ BIGNUM *blindm = NULL;
|
||||
const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv;
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
const EC_GROUP *group;
|
||||
@@ -243,8 +244,18 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
|
||||
}
|
||||
s = ret->s;
|
||||
|
||||
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
|
||||
- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
|
||||
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
+ blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
+ blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
+ if (blindm == NULL) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -284,18 +295,64 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
|
||||
+ /*
|
||||
+ * The normal signature calculation is:
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
|
||||
+ *
|
||||
+ * s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Generate a blinding value */
|
||||
+ do {
|
||||
+ if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY,
|
||||
+ BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
|
||||
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
|
||||
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
|
||||
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
|
||||
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
|
||||
+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
|
||||
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
|
||||
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
|
||||
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
|
||||
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
+ goto err;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
|
||||
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
|
||||
@@ -317,9 +374,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
|
||||
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
|
||||
ret = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
- BN_clear_free(m);
|
||||
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(kinv);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
|||
Fix CVE-2018-0732:
|
||||
|
||||
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0732
|
||||
|
||||
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
|
||||
|
||||
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4
|
||||
|
||||
From ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2018-0732
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
|
||||
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe)
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
|
||||
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
|
||||
---
|
||||
crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
|
||||
index fce9ff47f3..58003d7087 100644
|
||||
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
|
||||
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
|
||||
@@ -78,10 +78,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
|
||||
int ok = 0;
|
||||
int generate_new_key = 0;
|
||||
unsigned l;
|
||||
- BN_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
|
||||
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
||||
+ DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -420,7 +420,9 @@ required structures.")
|
|||
(string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/old/"
|
||||
(string-trim-right version char-set:letter)
|
||||
"/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
|
||||
(patches (search-patches "openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch"))
|
||||
(patches (search-patches "openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch"
|
||||
"openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch"
|
||||
"openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch"))
|
||||
(sha256
|
||||
(base32
|
||||
"05x509lccqjscgyi935z809pwfm708islypwhmjnb6cyvrn64daq"))))
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue