nixo
/
guix-devel
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

gnu: qemu: Update to 2.4.0.1. Include fix for CVE-2015-6855. 

* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-3209.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4037.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4103.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4104.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4105.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt1.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt2.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt3.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt4.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt5.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt6.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt7.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt8.patch,
  gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-5745.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-6855.patch: New file.
* gnu-system.am (dist_patch_DATA): Add the new patch and delete the old ones.
* gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu-headless): Update to 2.4.0.1.  Add the new patch
  and delete the old ones.
master
Mark H Weaver 2015-09-26 00:35:00 -04:00
parent e1556533d3
commit d2a6336609
17 changed files with 148 additions and 1345 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

15
gnu-system.am
View File

@ -607,20 +607,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
gnu/packages/patches/python-fix-tests.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/python2-rdflib-drop-sparqlwrapper.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/python2-pygobject-2-gi-info-type-error-domain.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-3209.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4037.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4103.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4104.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4105.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt1.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt2.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt3.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt4.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt5.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt6.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt7.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt8.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-5745.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-6855.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qt4-tests.patch \
gnu/packages/patches/qt5-runpath.patch \

49
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-3209.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From 9f7c594c006289ad41169b854d70f5da6e400a2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Date: Sun, 24 May 2015 10:53:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pcnet: force the buffer access to be in bounds during tx
4096 is the maximum length per TMD and it is also currently the size of
the relay buffer pcnet driver uses for sending the packet data to QEMU
for further processing. With packet spanning multiple TMDs it can
happen that the overall packet size will be bigger than sizeof(buffer),
which results in memory corruption.
Fix this by only allowing to queue maximum sizeof(buffer) bytes.
This is CVE-2015-3209.
[Fixed 3-space indentation to QEMU's 4-space coding standard.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Matt Tait <matttait@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
---
hw/net/pcnet.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/net/pcnet.c b/hw/net/pcnet.c
index bdfd38f..68b9981 100644
--- a/hw/net/pcnet.c
+++ b/hw/net/pcnet.c
@@ -1241,6 +1241,14 @@ static void pcnet_transmit(PCNetState *s)
}
bcnt = 4096 - GET_FIELD(tmd.length, TMDL, BCNT);
+
+ /* if multi-tmd packet outsizes s->buffer then skip it silently.
+ Note: this is not what real hw does */
+ if (s->xmit_pos + bcnt > sizeof(s->buffer)) {
+ s->xmit_pos = -1;
+ goto txdone;
+ }
+
s->phys_mem_read(s->dma_opaque, PHYSADDR(s, tmd.tbadr),
s->buffer + s->xmit_pos, bcnt, CSR_BSWP(s));
s->xmit_pos += bcnt;
--
2.2.1

53
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4037.patch
View File

@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
From 8b8f1c7e9ddb2e88a144638f6527bf70e32343e3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2015 14:12:26 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] slirp: use less predictable directory name in /tmp for smb
config (CVE-2015-4037)
In this version I used mkdtemp(3) which is:
_BSD_SOURCE
|| /* Since glibc 2.10: */
(_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L || _XOPEN_SOURCE >= 700)
(POSIX.1-2008), so should be available on systems we care about.
While at it, reset the resulting directory name within smb structure
on error so cleanup function wont try to remove directory which we
failed to create.
Signed-off-by: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
---
net/slirp.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/slirp.c b/net/slirp.c
index 0e15cf6..3533837 100644
--- a/net/slirp.c
+++ b/net/slirp.c
@@ -481,7 +481,6 @@ static void slirp_smb_cleanup(SlirpState *s)
static int slirp_smb(SlirpState* s, const char *exported_dir,
struct in_addr vserver_addr)
{
- static int instance;
char smb_conf[128];
char smb_cmdline[128];
struct passwd *passwd;
@@ -505,10 +504,10 @@ static int slirp_smb(SlirpState* s, const char *exported_dir,
return -1;
}
- snprintf(s->smb_dir, sizeof(s->smb_dir), "/tmp/qemu-smb.%ld-%d",
- (long)getpid(), instance++);
- if (mkdir(s->smb_dir, 0700) < 0) {
+ snprintf(s->smb_dir, sizeof(s->smb_dir), "/tmp/qemu-smb.XXXXXX");
+ if (!mkdtemp(s->smb_dir)) {
error_report("could not create samba server dir '%s'", s->smb_dir);
+ s->smb_dir[0] = 0;
return -1;
}
snprintf(smb_conf, sizeof(smb_conf), "%s/%s", s->smb_dir, "smb.conf");
--
2.2.1

135
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4103.patch
View File

@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
From 5c83b2f5b4b956e91dd6e5711f14df7ab800aefb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen: properly gate host writes of modified PCI CFG contents
The old logic didn't work as intended when an access spanned multiple
fields (for example a 32-bit access to the location of the MSI Message
Data field with the high 16 bits not being covered by any known field).
Remove it and derive which fields not to write to from the accessed
fields' emulation masks: When they're all ones, there's no point in
doing any host write.
This fixes a secondary issue at once: We obviously shouldn't make any
host write attempt when already the host read failed.
This is XSA-128.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 --
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 4 ----
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c
index d095c08..8923582 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
int index = 0;
XenPTRegGroup *reg_grp_entry = NULL;
int rc = 0;
- uint32_t read_val = 0;
+ uint32_t read_val = 0, wb_mask;
int emul_len = 0;
XenPTReg *reg_entry = NULL;
uint32_t find_addr = addr;
@@ -271,6 +271,9 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
if (rc < 0) {
XEN_PT_ERR(d, "pci_read_block failed. return value: %d.\n", rc);
memset(&read_val, 0xff, len);
+ wb_mask = 0;
+ } else {
+ wb_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - len) << 3);
}
/* pass directly to the real device for passthrough type register group */
@@ -298,6 +301,11 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
valid_mask <<= (find_addr - real_offset) << 3;
ptr_val = (uint8_t *)&val + (real_offset & 3);
+ if (reg->emu_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) {
+ wb_mask &= ~((reg->emu_mask
+ >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3))
+ << ((len - emul_len) << 3));
+ }
/* do emulation based on register size */
switch (reg->size) {
@@ -350,10 +358,19 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
memory_region_transaction_commit();
out:
- if (!(reg && reg->no_wb)) {
+ for (index = 0; wb_mask; index += len) {
/* unknown regs are passed through */
- rc = xen_host_pci_set_block(&s->real_device, addr,
- (uint8_t *)&val, len);
+ while (!(wb_mask & 0xff)) {
+ index++;
+ wb_mask >>= 8;
+ }
+ len = 0;
+ do {
+ len++;
+ wb_mask >>= 8;
+ } while (wb_mask & 0xff);
+ rc = xen_host_pci_set_block(&s->real_device, addr + index,
+ (uint8_t *)&val + index, len);
if (rc < 0) {
XEN_PT_ERR(d, "pci_write_block failed. return value: %d.\n", rc);
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
index 942dc60..52ceb85 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
@@ -105,8 +105,6 @@ struct XenPTRegInfo {
uint32_t ro_mask;
/* reg emulate field mask (ON:emu, OFF:passthrough) */
uint32_t emu_mask;
- /* no write back allowed */
- uint32_t no_wb;
xen_pt_conf_reg_init init;
/* read/write function pointer
* for double_word/word/byte size */
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 95a51db..dae0519 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -1279,7 +1279,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.init_val = 0x00000000,
.ro_mask = 0x00000003,
.emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
- .no_wb = 1,
.init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
.u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
.u.dw.write = xen_pt_msgaddr32_reg_write,
@@ -1291,7 +1290,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.init_val = 0x00000000,
.ro_mask = 0x00000000,
.emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
- .no_wb = 1,
.init = xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_init,
.u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
.u.dw.write = xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_write,
@@ -1303,7 +1301,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.init_val = 0x0000,
.ro_mask = 0x0000,
.emu_mask = 0xFFFF,
- .no_wb = 1,
.init = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write,
@@ -1315,7 +1312,6 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.init_val = 0x0000,
.ro_mask = 0x0000,
.emu_mask = 0xFFFF,
- .no_wb = 1,
.init = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write,
--
2.2.1

189
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4104.patch
View File

@ -1,189 +0,0 @@
From 7611dae8a69f0f1775ba1a9a942961c2aa10d88e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen: don't allow guest to control MSI mask register
It's being used by the hypervisor. For now simply mimic a device not
capable of masking, and fully emulate any accesses a guest may issue
nevertheless as simple reads/writes without side effects.
This is XSA-129.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/pci/msi.c | 4 --
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h | 2 +
3 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/pci/msi.c b/hw/pci/msi.c
index c111dba..f9c0484 100644
--- a/hw/pci/msi.c
+++ b/hw/pci/msi.c
@@ -21,10 +21,6 @@
#include "hw/pci/msi.h"
#include "qemu/range.h"
-/* Eventually those constants should go to Linux pci_regs.h */
-#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_32 0x10
-#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_64 0x14
-
/* PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO */
#define PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_LO_MASK (~0x3)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index dae0519..68b8f22 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -1016,13 +1016,9 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pm[] = {
*/
/* Helper */
-static bool xen_pt_msgdata_check_type(uint32_t offset, uint16_t flags)
-{
- /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */
- bool is_32 = (offset == PCI_MSI_DATA_32) && !(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT);
- bool is_64 = (offset == PCI_MSI_DATA_64) && (flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT);
- return is_32 || is_64;
-}
+#define xen_pt_msi_check_type(offset, flags, what) \
+ ((offset) == ((flags) & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT ? \
+ PCI_MSI_##what##_64 : PCI_MSI_##what##_32))
/* Message Control register */
static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
@@ -1134,7 +1130,45 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
uint32_t offset = reg->offset;
/* check the offset whether matches the type or not */
- if (xen_pt_msgdata_check_type(offset, flags)) {
+ if (xen_pt_msi_check_type(offset, flags, DATA)) {
+ *data = reg->init_val;
+ } else {
+ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* this function will be called twice (for 32 bit and 64 bit type) */
+/* initialize Mask register */
+static int xen_pt_mask_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
+ XenPTRegInfo *reg, uint32_t real_offset,
+ uint32_t *data)
+{
+ uint32_t flags = s->msi->flags;
+
+ /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */
+ if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) {
+ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG;
+ } else if (xen_pt_msi_check_type(reg->offset, flags, MASK)) {
+ *data = reg->init_val;
+ } else {
+ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* this function will be called twice (for 32 bit and 64 bit type) */
+/* initialize Pending register */
+static int xen_pt_pending_reg_init(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
+ XenPTRegInfo *reg, uint32_t real_offset,
+ uint32_t *data)
+{
+ uint32_t flags = s->msi->flags;
+
+ /* check the offset whether matches the type or not */
+ if (!(flags & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT)) {
+ *data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG;
+ } else if (xen_pt_msi_check_type(reg->offset, flags, PENDING)) {
*data = reg->init_val;
} else {
*data = XEN_PT_INVALID_REG;
@@ -1222,7 +1256,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
uint32_t offset = reg->offset;
/* check the offset whether matches the type or not */
- if (!xen_pt_msgdata_check_type(offset, msi->flags)) {
+ if (!xen_pt_msi_check_type(offset, msi->flags, DATA)) {
/* exit I/O emulator */
XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "the offset does not match the 32/64 bit type!\n");
return -1;
@@ -1267,7 +1301,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0000,
.ro_mask = 0xFF8E,
- .emu_mask = 0x007F,
+ .emu_mask = 0x017F,
.init = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write,
@@ -1316,6 +1350,50 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write,
},
+ /* Mask reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 32-bit devices) */
+ {
+ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_32,
+ .size = 4,
+ .init_val = 0x00000000,
+ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+ .emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+ .init = xen_pt_mask_reg_init,
+ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
+ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write,
+ },
+ /* Mask reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 64-bit devices) */
+ {
+ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_64,
+ .size = 4,
+ .init_val = 0x00000000,
+ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+ .emu_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+ .init = xen_pt_mask_reg_init,
+ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
+ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write,
+ },
+ /* Pending reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 32-bit devices) */
+ {
+ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_32 + 4,
+ .size = 4,
+ .init_val = 0x00000000,
+ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+ .emu_mask = 0x00000000,
+ .init = xen_pt_pending_reg_init,
+ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
+ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write,
+ },
+ /* Pending reg (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_MASKBIT set, for 64-bit devices) */
+ {
+ .offset = PCI_MSI_MASK_64 + 4,
+ .size = 4,
+ .init_val = 0x00000000,
+ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
+ .emu_mask = 0x00000000,
+ .init = xen_pt_pending_reg_init,
+ .u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
+ .u.dw.write = xen_pt_long_reg_write,
+ },
{
.size = 0,
},
diff --git a/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h b/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h
index 56a404b..57e8c80 100644
--- a/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h
+++ b/include/hw/pci/pci_regs.h
@@ -298,8 +298,10 @@
#define PCI_MSI_ADDRESS_HI 8 /* Upper 32 bits (if PCI_MSI_FLAGS_64BIT set) */
#define PCI_MSI_DATA_32 8 /* 16 bits of data for 32-bit devices */
#define PCI_MSI_MASK_32 12 /* Mask bits register for 32-bit devices */
+#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_32 16 /* Pending bits register for 32-bit devices */
#define PCI_MSI_DATA_64 12 /* 16 bits of data for 64-bit devices */
#define PCI_MSI_MASK_64 16 /* Mask bits register for 64-bit devices */
+#define PCI_MSI_PENDING_64 20 /* Pending bits register for 32-bit devices */
/* MSI-X registers */
#define PCI_MSIX_FLAGS 2
--
2.2.1

85
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4105.patch
View File

@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
From b38ec5ee7a581776bbce0bdaecb397632c3c4791 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/MSI-X: limit error messages
Limit error messages resulting from bad guest behavior to avoid allowing
the guest to cause the control domain's disk to fill.
The first message in pci_msix_write() can simply be deleted, as this
is indeed bad guest behavior, but such out of bounds writes don't
really need to be logged.
The second one is more problematic, as there guest behavior may only
appear to be wrong: For one, the old logic didn't take the mask-all bit
into account. And then this shouldn't depend on host device state (i.e.
the host may have masked the entry without the guest having done so).
Plus these writes shouldn't be dropped even when an entry is unmasked.
Instead, if they can't be made take effect right away, they should take
effect on the next unmasking or enabling operation - the specification
explicitly describes such caching behavior. Until we can validly drop
the message (implementing such caching/latching behavior), issue the
message just once per MSI-X table entry.
Note that the log message in pci_msix_read() similar to the one being
removed here is not an issue: "addr" being of unsigned type, and the
maximum size of the MSI-X table being 32k, entry_nr simply can't be
negative and hence the conditonal guarding issuing of the message will
never be true.
This is XSA-130.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 1 +
hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c | 12 +++++++-----
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
index 52ceb85..8c9b6c2 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
@@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ typedef struct XenPTMSIXEntry {
uint32_t data;
uint32_t vector_ctrl;
bool updated; /* indicate whether MSI ADDR or DATA is updated */
+ bool warned; /* avoid issuing (bogus) warning more than once */
} XenPTMSIXEntry;
typedef struct XenPTMSIX {
uint32_t ctrl_offset;
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
index 9ed9321..68db623 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_msi.c
@@ -434,11 +434,10 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
XenPCIPassthroughState *s = opaque;
XenPTMSIX *msix = s->msix;
XenPTMSIXEntry *entry;
- int entry_nr, offset;
+ unsigned int entry_nr, offset;
entry_nr = addr / PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_SIZE;
- if (entry_nr < 0 || entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) {
- XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "asked MSI-X entry '%i' invalid!\n", entry_nr);
+ if (entry_nr >= msix->total_entries) {
return;
}
entry = &msix->msix_entry[entry_nr];
@@ -460,8 +459,11 @@ static void pci_msix_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
+ PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_VECTOR_CTRL;
if (msix->enabled && !(*vec_ctrl & PCI_MSIX_ENTRY_CTRL_MASKBIT)) {
- XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is"
- " already enabled.\n", entry_nr);
+ if (!entry->warned) {
+ entry->warned = true;
+ XEN_PT_ERR(&s->dev, "Can't update msix entry %d since MSI-X is"
+ " already enabled.\n", entry_nr);
+ }
return;
}
--
2.2.1

72
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt1.patch
View File

@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
From d1d35cf4ffb6a60a356193397919e83306d0bb74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/MSI: don't open-code pass-through of enable bit
modifications
Without this the actual XSA-131 fix would cause the enable bit to not
get set anymore (due to the write back getting suppressed there based
on the OR of emu_mask, ro_mask, and res_mask).
Note that the fiddling with the enable bit shouldn't really be done by
qemu, but making this work right (via libxc and the hypervisor) will
require more extensive changes, which can be postponed until after the
security issue got addressed.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 10 ++--------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 68b8f22..436d0fd 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -1053,7 +1053,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
XenPTMSI *msi = s->msi;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t raw_val;
/* Currently no support for multi-vector */
if (*val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_QSIZE) {
@@ -1066,12 +1065,11 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
msi->flags |= cfg_entry->data & ~PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE;
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- raw_val = *val;
throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
/* update MSI */
- if (raw_val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE) {
+ if (*val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE) {
/* setup MSI pirq for the first time */
if (!msi->initialized) {
/* Init physical one */
@@ -1099,10 +1097,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
xen_pt_msi_disable(s);
}
- /* pass through MSI_ENABLE bit */
- *val &= ~PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE;
- *val |= raw_val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE;
-
return 0;
}
@@ -1301,7 +1295,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0000,
.ro_mask = 0xFF8E,
- .emu_mask = 0x017F,
+ .emu_mask = 0x017E,
.init = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write,
--
2.2.1

81
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt2.patch
View File

@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
From d61bb2482dc0c7426f451f23ba7e2748ae2cc06d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: consolidate PM capability emu_mask
There's no point in xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_{read,write}() each ORing
PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK and PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET into a local
emu_mask variable - we can have the same effect by setting the field
descriptor's emu_mask member suitably right away. Note that
xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() is being retained in order to allow later
patches to be less intrusive.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 25 ++++---------------------
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 436d0fd..516236a 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -933,38 +933,21 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = {
* Power Management Capability
*/
-/* read Power Management Control/Status register */
-static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_read(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
- uint16_t *value, uint16_t valid_mask)
-{
- XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
- uint16_t valid_emu_mask = reg->emu_mask;
-
- valid_emu_mask |= PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK | PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET;
-
- valid_emu_mask = valid_emu_mask & valid_mask;
- *value = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*value, cfg_entry->data, ~valid_emu_mask);
-
- return 0;
-}
/* write Power Management Control/Status register */
static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
XenPTReg *cfg_entry, uint16_t *val,
uint16_t dev_value, uint16_t valid_mask)
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
- uint16_t emu_mask = reg->emu_mask;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
- emu_mask |= PCI_PM_CTRL_STATE_MASK | PCI_PM_CTRL_NO_SOFT_RESET;
-
/* modify emulate register */
- writable_mask = emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
+ writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~emu_mask & valid_mask;
+ throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
return 0;
@@ -1000,9 +983,9 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pm[] = {
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0008,
.ro_mask = 0xE1FC,
- .emu_mask = 0x8100,
+ .emu_mask = 0x810B,
.init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
- .u.w.read = xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_read,
+ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write,
},
{
--
2.2.1

33
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt3.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From c4ff1e68c621928abc680266cad0a451686c403b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: correctly handle PM status bit
xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write() needs an adjustment to deal with the RW1C
nature of the not passed through bit 15 (PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 516236a..027ac32 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -948,7 +948,8 @@ static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
+ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value & ~PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS,
+ throughable_mask);
return 0;
}
--
2.2.1

260
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt4.patch
View File

@ -1,260 +0,0 @@
From 0e7ef22136955169a0fd03c4e41af95662352733 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: split out calculation of throughable mask in PCI
config space handling
This is just to avoid having to adjust that calculation later in
multiple places.
Note that including ->ro_mask in get_throughable_mask()'s calculation
is only an apparent (i.e. benign) behavioral change: For r/o fields it
doesn't matter > whether they get passed through - either the same flag
is also set in emu_mask (then there's no change at all) or the field is
r/o in hardware (and hence a write won't change it anyway).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 027ac32..3833b9e 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -95,6 +95,14 @@ XenPTReg *xen_pt_find_reg(XenPTRegGroup *reg_grp, uint32_t address)
return NULL;
}
+static uint32_t get_throughable_mask(const XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
+ const XenPTRegInfo *reg,
+ uint32_t valid_mask)
+{
+ uint32_t throughable_mask = ~(reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask);
+
+ return throughable_mask & valid_mask;
+}
/****************
* general register functions
@@ -157,14 +165,13 @@ static int xen_pt_byte_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint8_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint8_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint8_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
/* modify emulate register */
writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
return 0;
@@ -175,14 +182,13 @@ static int xen_pt_word_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
/* modify emulate register */
writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
return 0;
@@ -193,14 +199,13 @@ static int xen_pt_long_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint32_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint32_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
/* modify emulate register */
writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
return 0;
@@ -292,15 +297,13 @@ static int xen_pt_cmd_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
/* modify emulate register */
writable_mask = ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
-
if (*val & PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE) {
throughable_mask |= PCI_COMMAND_INTX_DISABLE;
} else {
@@ -454,7 +457,6 @@ static int xen_pt_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
PCIDevice *d = &s->dev;
const PCIIORegion *r;
uint32_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0;
uint32_t bar_emu_mask = 0;
uint32_t bar_ro_mask = 0;
uint32_t r_size = 0;
@@ -511,8 +513,7 @@ static int xen_pt_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s, XenPTReg *cfg_entry,
}
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~bar_emu_mask & valid_mask;
- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
+ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0);
return 0;
}
@@ -526,9 +527,8 @@ static int xen_pt_exp_rom_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
XenPTRegion *base = NULL;
PCIDevice *d = (PCIDevice *)&s->dev;
uint32_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint32_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
pcibus_t r_size = 0;
- uint32_t bar_emu_mask = 0;
uint32_t bar_ro_mask = 0;
r_size = d->io_regions[PCI_ROM_SLOT].size;
@@ -537,7 +537,6 @@ static int xen_pt_exp_rom_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
r_size = xen_pt_get_emul_size(base->bar_flag, r_size);
/* set emulate mask and read-only mask */
- bar_emu_mask = reg->emu_mask;
bar_ro_mask = (reg->ro_mask | (r_size - 1)) & ~PCI_ROM_ADDRESS_ENABLE;
/* modify emulate register */
@@ -545,7 +544,6 @@ static int xen_pt_exp_rom_bar_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~bar_emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
return 0;
@@ -940,14 +938,13 @@ static int xen_pt_pmcsr_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
/* modify emulate register */
writable_mask = reg->emu_mask & ~reg->ro_mask & valid_mask;
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value & ~PCI_PM_CTRL_PME_STATUS,
throughable_mask);
@@ -1036,7 +1033,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
XenPTMSI *msi = s->msi;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
/* Currently no support for multi-vector */
if (*val & PCI_MSI_FLAGS_QSIZE) {
@@ -1049,7 +1046,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
msi->flags |= cfg_entry->data & ~PCI_MSI_FLAGS_ENABLE;
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
/* update MSI */
@@ -1161,7 +1157,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr32_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint32_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0;
uint32_t old_addr = cfg_entry->data;
/* modify emulate register */
@@ -1170,8 +1165,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr32_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
s->msi->addr_lo = cfg_entry->data;
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
+ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0);
/* update MSI */
if (cfg_entry->data != old_addr) {
@@ -1189,7 +1183,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint32_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint32_t throughable_mask = 0;
uint32_t old_addr = cfg_entry->data;
/* check whether the type is 64 bit or not */
@@ -1206,8 +1199,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgaddr64_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
s->msi->addr_hi = cfg_entry->data;
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
+ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0);
/* update MSI */
if (cfg_entry->data != old_addr) {
@@ -1229,7 +1221,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
XenPTMSI *msi = s->msi;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
uint16_t old_data = cfg_entry->data;
uint32_t offset = reg->offset;
@@ -1247,8 +1238,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msgdata_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
msi->data = cfg_entry->data;
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
- *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
+ *val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, 0);
/* update MSI */
if (cfg_entry->data != old_data) {
@@ -1410,7 +1400,7 @@ static int xen_pt_msixctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
{
XenPTRegInfo *reg = cfg_entry->reg;
uint16_t writable_mask = 0;
- uint16_t throughable_mask = 0;
+ uint16_t throughable_mask = get_throughable_mask(s, reg, valid_mask);
int debug_msix_enabled_old;
/* modify emulate register */
@@ -1418,7 +1408,6 @@ static int xen_pt_msixctrl_reg_write(XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
cfg_entry->data = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, cfg_entry->data, writable_mask);
/* create value for writing to I/O device register */
- throughable_mask = ~reg->emu_mask & valid_mask;
*val = XEN_PT_MERGE_VALUE(*val, dev_value, throughable_mask);
/* update MSI-X */
--
2.2.1

33
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt5.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
From 45ebe3916ab16f859ed930e92fbd52d84d5dcdaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: mark all PCIe capability bits read-only
xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[]'s PCI_EXP_DEVCAP needs to cover all bits as read-
only to avoid unintended write-back (just a precaution, the field ought
to be read-only in hardware).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 3833b9e..9f6c00e 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -871,7 +871,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = {
.offset = PCI_EXP_DEVCAP,
.size = 4,
.init_val = 0x00000000,
- .ro_mask = 0x1FFCFFFF,
+ .ro_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF,
.emu_mask = 0x10000000,
.init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
.u.dw.read = xen_pt_long_reg_read,
--
2.2.1

89
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt6.patch
View File

@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
From 0ad3393ad032f76e88b4dbd04d36ad84dff75dd6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: mark reserved bits in PCI config space fields
The adjustments are solely to make the subsequent patches work right
(and hence make the patch set consistent), namely if permissive mode
(introduced by the last patch) gets used (as both reserved registers
and reserved fields must be similarly protected from guest access in
default mode, but the guest should be allowed access to them in
permissive mode).
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 ++
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 14 +++++++++-----
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
index 8c9b6c2..f9795eb 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ struct XenPTRegInfo {
uint32_t offset;
uint32_t size;
uint32_t init_val;
+ /* reg reserved field mask (ON:reserved, OFF:defined) */
+ uint32_t res_mask;
/* reg read only field mask (ON:RO/ROS, OFF:other) */
uint32_t ro_mask;
/* reg emulate field mask (ON:emu, OFF:passthrough) */
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 9f6c00e..efd8bac 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_header0[] = {
.offset = PCI_COMMAND,
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0000,
- .ro_mask = 0xF880,
+ .res_mask = 0xF880,
.emu_mask = 0x0743,
.init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
@@ -603,7 +603,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_header0[] = {
.offset = PCI_STATUS,
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0000,
- .ro_mask = 0x06FF,
+ .res_mask = 0x0007,
+ .ro_mask = 0x06F8,
.emu_mask = 0x0010,
.init = xen_pt_status_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
@@ -980,7 +981,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pm[] = {
.offset = PCI_PM_CTRL,
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0008,
- .ro_mask = 0xE1FC,
+ .res_mask = 0x00F0,
+ .ro_mask = 0xE10C,
.emu_mask = 0x810B,
.init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
@@ -1268,7 +1270,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msi[] = {
.offset = PCI_MSI_FLAGS,
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0000,
- .ro_mask = 0xFF8E,
+ .res_mask = 0xFE00,
+ .ro_mask = 0x018E,
.emu_mask = 0x017E,
.init = xen_pt_msgctrl_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
@@ -1446,7 +1449,8 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_msix[] = {
.offset = PCI_MSI_FLAGS,
.size = 2,
.init_val = 0x0000,
- .ro_mask = 0x3FFF,
+ .res_mask = 0x3800,
+ .ro_mask = 0x07FF,
.emu_mask = 0x0000,
.init = xen_pt_msixctrl_reg_init,
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
--
2.2.1

72
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt7.patch
View File

@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
From a88a3f887181605f4487a22bdfb7d87ffafde5d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: add a few PCI config space field descriptions
Since the next patch will turn all not explicitly described fields
read-only by default, those fields that have guest writable bits need
to be given explicit descriptors.
This is a preparatory patch for XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index efd8bac..19f926b 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -754,6 +754,15 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_vpd[] = {
.u.b.write = xen_pt_byte_reg_write,
},
{
+ .offset = PCI_VPD_ADDR,
+ .size = 2,
+ .ro_mask = 0x0003,
+ .emu_mask = 0x0003,
+ .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
+ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
+ .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write,
+ },
+ {
.size = 0,
},
};
@@ -889,6 +898,16 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = {
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write,
},
+ /* Device Status reg */
+ {
+ .offset = PCI_EXP_DEVSTA,
+ .size = 2,
+ .res_mask = 0xFFC0,
+ .ro_mask = 0x0030,
+ .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
+ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
+ .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write,
+ },
/* Link Control reg */
{
.offset = PCI_EXP_LNKCTL,
@@ -900,6 +919,15 @@ static XenPTRegInfo xen_pt_emu_reg_pcie[] = {
.u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
.u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write,
},
+ /* Link Status reg */
+ {
+ .offset = PCI_EXP_LNKSTA,
+ .size = 2,
+ .ro_mask = 0x3FFF,
+ .init = xen_pt_common_reg_init,
+ .u.w.read = xen_pt_word_reg_read,
+ .u.w.write = xen_pt_word_reg_write,
+ },
/* Device Control 2 reg */
{
.offset = 0x28,
--
2.2.1

132
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt8.patch
View File

@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
From c25bbf1545a53ac051f9e51d4140e397660c10ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Date: Tue, 2 Jun 2015 15:07:01 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] xen/pt: unknown PCI config space fields should be read-only
... by default. Add a per-device "permissive" mode similar to pciback's
to allow restoring previous behavior (and hence break security again,
i.e. should be used only for trusted guests).
This is part of XSA-131.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>)
---
hw/xen/xen_pt.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
hw/xen/xen_pt.h | 2 ++
hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c | 4 ++++
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c
index 8923582..9afcda8 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.c
@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
XenPTReg *reg_entry = NULL;
uint32_t find_addr = addr;
XenPTRegInfo *reg = NULL;
+ bool wp_flag = false;
if (xen_pt_pci_config_access_check(d, addr, len)) {
return;
@@ -278,6 +279,10 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
/* pass directly to the real device for passthrough type register group */
if (reg_grp_entry == NULL) {
+ if (!s->permissive) {
+ wb_mask = 0;
+ wp_flag = true;
+ }
goto out;
}
@@ -298,12 +303,15 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
uint32_t real_offset = reg_grp_entry->base_offset + reg->offset;
uint32_t valid_mask = 0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - emul_len) << 3);
uint8_t *ptr_val = NULL;
+ uint32_t wp_mask = reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask;
valid_mask <<= (find_addr - real_offset) << 3;
ptr_val = (uint8_t *)&val + (real_offset & 3);
- if (reg->emu_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) {
- wb_mask &= ~((reg->emu_mask
- >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3))
+ if (!s->permissive) {
+ wp_mask |= reg->res_mask;
+ }
+ if (wp_mask == (0xFFFFFFFF >> ((4 - reg->size) << 3))) {
+ wb_mask &= ~((wp_mask >> ((find_addr - real_offset) << 3))
<< ((len - emul_len) << 3));
}
@@ -347,6 +355,16 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
} else {
/* nothing to do with passthrough type register,
* continue to find next byte */
+ if (!s->permissive) {
+ wb_mask &= ~(0xff << ((len - emul_len) << 3));
+ /* Unused BARs will make it here, but we don't want to issue
+ * warnings for writes to them (bogus writes get dealt with
+ * above).
+ */
+ if (index < 0) {
+ wp_flag = true;
+ }
+ }
emul_len--;
find_addr++;
}
@@ -358,6 +376,13 @@ static void xen_pt_pci_write_config(PCIDevice *d, uint32_t addr,
memory_region_transaction_commit();
out:
+ if (wp_flag && !s->permissive_warned) {
+ s->permissive_warned = true;
+ xen_pt_log(d, "Write-back to unknown field 0x%02x (partially) inhibited (0x%0*x)\n",
+ addr, len * 2, wb_mask);
+ xen_pt_log(d, "If the device doesn't work, try enabling permissive mode\n");
+ xen_pt_log(d, "(unsafe) and if it helps report the problem to xen-devel\n");
+ }
for (index = 0; wb_mask; index += len) {
/* unknown regs are passed through */
while (!(wb_mask & 0xff)) {
@@ -824,6 +849,7 @@ static void xen_pt_unregister_device(PCIDevice *d)
static Property xen_pci_passthrough_properties[] = {
DEFINE_PROP_PCI_HOST_DEVADDR("hostaddr", XenPCIPassthroughState, hostaddr),
+ DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("permissive", XenPCIPassthroughState, permissive, false),
DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST(),
};
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
index f9795eb..4bba559 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt.h
@@ -197,6 +197,8 @@ struct XenPCIPassthroughState {
PCIHostDeviceAddress hostaddr;
bool is_virtfn;
+ bool permissive;
+ bool permissive_warned;
XenHostPCIDevice real_device;
XenPTRegion bases[PCI_NUM_REGIONS]; /* Access regions */
QLIST_HEAD(, XenPTRegGroup) reg_grps;
diff --git a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
index 19f926b..f3cf069 100644
--- a/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
+++ b/hw/xen/xen_pt_config_init.c
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ static uint32_t get_throughable_mask(const XenPCIPassthroughState *s,
{
uint32_t throughable_mask = ~(reg->emu_mask | reg->ro_mask);
+ if (!s->permissive) {
+ throughable_mask &= ~reg->res_mask;
+ }
+
return throughable_mask & valid_mask;
}
--
2.2.1

32
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-5745.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
From 7882080388be5088e72c425b02223c02e6cb4295 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 23 Jul 2015 17:52:02 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] virtio-serial: fix ANY_LAYOUT
Don't assume a specific layout for control messages.
Required by virtio 1.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
---
hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c b/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c
index 78c73e5..929e49c 100644
--- a/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c
+++ b/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c
@@ -195,7 +195,8 @@ static size_t send_control_msg(VirtIOSerial *vser, void *buf, size_t len)
return 0;
}
- memcpy(elem.in_sg[0].iov_base, buf, len);
+ /* TODO: detect a buffer that's too short, set NEEDS_RESET */
+ iov_from_buf(elem.in_sg, elem.in_num, 0, buf, len);
virtqueue_push(vq, &elem, len);
virtio_notify(VIRTIO_DEVICE(vser), vq);
--
2.4.3

144
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2015-6855.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
From d9033e1d3aa666c5071580617a57bd853c5d794a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Sep 2015 14:17:05 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] ide: fix ATAPI command permissions
We're a little too lenient with what we'll let an ATAPI drive handle.
Clamp down on the IDE command execution table to remove CD_OK permissions
from commands that are not and have never been ATAPI commands.
For ATAPI command validity, please see:
- ATA4 Section 6.5 ("PACKET Command feature set")
- ATA8/ACS Section 4.3 ("The PACKET feature set")
- ACS3 Section 4.3 ("The PACKET feature set")
ACS3 has a historical command validity table in Table B.4
("Historical Command Assignments") that can be referenced to find when
a command was introduced, deprecated, obsoleted, etc.
The only reference for ATAPI command validity is by checking that
version's PACKET feature set section.
ATAPI was introduced by T13 into ATA4, all commands retired prior to ATA4
therefore are assumed to have never been ATAPI commands.
Mandatory commands, as listed in ATA8-ACS3, are:
- DEVICE RESET
- EXECUTE DEVICE DIAGNOSTIC
- IDENTIFY DEVICE
- IDENTIFY PACKET DEVICE
- NOP
- PACKET
- READ SECTOR(S)
- SET FEATURES
Optional commands as listed in ATA8-ACS3, are:
- FLUSH CACHE
- READ LOG DMA EXT
- READ LOG EXT
- WRITE LOG DMA EXT
- WRITE LOG EXT
All other commands are illegal to send to an ATAPI device and should
be rejected by the device.
CD_OK removal justifications:
0x06 WIN_DSM Defined in ACS2. Not valid for ATAPI.
0x21 WIN_READ_ONCE Retired in ATA5. Not ATAPI in ATA4.
0x94 WIN_STANDBYNOW2 Retired in ATA4. Did not coexist with ATAPI.
0x95 WIN_IDLEIMMEDIATE2 Retired in ATA4. Did not coexist with ATAPI.
0x96 WIN_STANDBY2 Retired in ATA4. Did not coexist with ATAPI.
0x97 WIN_SETIDLE2 Retired in ATA4. Did not coexist with ATAPI.
0x98 WIN_CHECKPOWERMODE2 Retired in ATA4. Did not coexist with ATAPI.
0x99 WIN_SLEEPNOW2 Retired in ATA4. Did not coexist with ATAPI.
0xE0 WIN_STANDBYNOW1 Not part of ATAPI in ATA4, ACS or ACS3.
0xE1 WIN_IDLEIMMDIATE Not part of ATAPI in ATA4, ACS or ACS3.
0xE2 WIN_STANDBY Not part of ATAPI in ATA4, ACS or ACS3.
0xE3 WIN_SETIDLE1 Not part of ATAPI in ATA4, ACS or ACS3.
0xE4 WIN_CHECKPOWERMODE1 Not part of ATAPI in ATA4, ACS or ACS3.
0xE5 WIN_SLEEPNOW1 Not part of ATAPI in ATA4, ACS or ACS3.
0xF8 WIN_READ_NATIVE_MAX Obsoleted in ACS3. Not ATAPI in ATA4 or ACS.
This patch fixes a divide by zero fault that can be caused by sending
the WIN_READ_NATIVE_MAX command to an ATAPI drive, which causes it to
attempt to use zeroed CHS values to perform sector arithmetic.
Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1441816082-21031-1-git-send-email-jsnow@redhat.com
CC: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
---
hw/ide/core.c | 30 +++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/ide/core.c b/hw/ide/core.c
index 8ba04df..1cc6945 100644
--- a/hw/ide/core.c
+++ b/hw/ide/core.c
@@ -1746,11 +1746,11 @@ static const struct {
} ide_cmd_table[0x100] = {
/* NOP not implemented, mandatory for CD */
[CFA_REQ_EXT_ERROR_CODE] = { cmd_cfa_req_ext_error_code, CFA_OK },
- [WIN_DSM] = { cmd_data_set_management, ALL_OK },
+ [WIN_DSM] = { cmd_data_set_management, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_DEVICE_RESET] = { cmd_device_reset, CD_OK },
[WIN_RECAL] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC},
[WIN_READ] = { cmd_read_pio, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_READ_ONCE] = { cmd_read_pio, ALL_OK },
+ [WIN_READ_ONCE] = { cmd_read_pio, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_READ_EXT] = { cmd_read_pio, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_READDMA_EXT] = { cmd_read_dma, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_READ_NATIVE_MAX_EXT] = { cmd_read_native_max, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
@@ -1769,12 +1769,12 @@ static const struct {
[CFA_TRANSLATE_SECTOR] = { cmd_cfa_translate_sector, CFA_OK },
[WIN_DIAGNOSE] = { cmd_exec_dev_diagnostic, ALL_OK },
[WIN_SPECIFY] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
- [WIN_STANDBYNOW2] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_IDLEIMMEDIATE2] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_STANDBY2] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_SETIDLE2] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_CHECKPOWERMODE2] = { cmd_check_power_mode, ALL_OK | SET_DSC },
- [WIN_SLEEPNOW2] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
+ [WIN_STANDBYNOW2] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_IDLEIMMEDIATE2] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_STANDBY2] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_SETIDLE2] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_CHECKPOWERMODE2] = { cmd_check_power_mode, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
+ [WIN_SLEEPNOW2] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_PACKETCMD] = { cmd_packet, CD_OK },
[WIN_PIDENTIFY] = { cmd_identify_packet, CD_OK },
[WIN_SMART] = { cmd_smart, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
@@ -1788,19 +1788,19 @@ static const struct {
[WIN_WRITEDMA] = { cmd_write_dma, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_WRITEDMA_ONCE] = { cmd_write_dma, HD_CFA_OK },
[CFA_WRITE_MULTI_WO_ERASE] = { cmd_write_multiple, CFA_OK },
- [WIN_STANDBYNOW1] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_IDLEIMMEDIATE] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_STANDBY] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_SETIDLE1] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
- [WIN_CHECKPOWERMODE1] = { cmd_check_power_mode, ALL_OK | SET_DSC },
- [WIN_SLEEPNOW1] = { cmd_nop, ALL_OK },
+ [WIN_STANDBYNOW1] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_IDLEIMMEDIATE] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_STANDBY] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_SETIDLE1] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
+ [WIN_CHECKPOWERMODE1] = { cmd_check_power_mode, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
+ [WIN_SLEEPNOW1] = { cmd_nop, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_FLUSH_CACHE] = { cmd_flush_cache, ALL_OK },
[WIN_FLUSH_CACHE_EXT] = { cmd_flush_cache, HD_CFA_OK },
[WIN_IDENTIFY] = { cmd_identify, ALL_OK },
[WIN_SETFEATURES] = { cmd_set_features, ALL_OK | SET_DSC },
[IBM_SENSE_CONDITION] = { cmd_ibm_sense_condition, CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
[CFA_WEAR_LEVEL] = { cmd_cfa_erase_sectors, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
- [WIN_READ_NATIVE_MAX] = { cmd_read_native_max, ALL_OK | SET_DSC },
+ [WIN_READ_NATIVE_MAX] = { cmd_read_native_max, HD_CFA_OK | SET_DSC },
};
static bool ide_cmd_permitted(IDEState *s, uint32_t cmd)
--
2.4.3

19
gnu/packages/qemu.scm
View File

@ -44,28 +44,15 @@
;; This is QEMU without GUI support.
(package
(name "qemu-headless")
(version "2.3.1")
(version "2.4.0.1")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append "http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/qemu-"
version ".tar.bz2"))
(sha256
(base32
"0px1vhkglxzjdxkkqln98znv832n1sn79g5inh3aw72216c047b6"))
(patches (map search-patch '("qemu-CVE-2015-3209.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4037.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4103.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4104.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4105.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt1.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt2.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt3.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt4.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt5.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt6.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt7.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-4106-pt8.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2015-5745.patch")))))
"1nqv5p94zpnhcaqkifnn83ap7dd0qrb0qiicswbyhhby0f48pzpc"))
(patches (map search-patch '("qemu-CVE-2015-6855.patch")))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
'(#:phases (alist-replace