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gnu: openssl@1.1: Update to 1.1.0i [fix CVE-2018-0737]. 

Also includes a fix for CVE-2018-0732, and a different approach to
fixing CVE-2018-0495.

* gnu/packages/tls.scm (openssl-next): Update to 1.1.0i.
[sources]: Remove CVE patches.
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch: Delete...
* gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch: ...both files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
master
Tobias Geerinckx-Rice 2018-08-15 00:24:17 +02:00
parent 34362ff6d6
commit d87e547702
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 0DB0FF884F556D79
4 changed files with 4 additions and 210 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

2
gnu/local.mk
View File

@ -999,8 +999,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-runpath.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0495.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.0.2-CVE-2018-0732.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/openssl-c-rehash-in.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/orpheus-cast-errors-and-includes.patch \

152
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch
View File

@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2018-0495:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0495
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/our-research/technical-advisory-return-of-the-hidden-number-problem/
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a
From 0c27d793745c7837b13646302b6890a556b7017a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 12:10:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Add blinding to an ECDSA signature
Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) has demonstrated a side channel attack on an
ECDSA signature operation. During signing the signer calculates:
s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
The addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a
flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature
operations.
As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to
the operation so that:
s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
---
CHANGES | 4 +++
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
index 72e2f0f28b..449be0e92a 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0, i;
- BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *kinv = NULL, *s, *m = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *blind = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *blindm = NULL;
const BIGNUM *order, *ckinv;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *group;
@@ -243,8 +244,18 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
}
s = ret->s;
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL || (m = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ ctx = BN_CTX_secure_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ m = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ blind = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ blindm = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (blindm == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
@@ -284,18 +295,64 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
}
}
- if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, priv_key, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
+ /*
+ * The normal signature calculation is:
+ *
+ * s := k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order
+ *
+ * We will blind this to protect against side channel attacks
+ *
+ * s := k^-1 * blind^-1 * (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order
+ */
+
+ /* Generate a blinding value */
+ do {
+ if (!BN_rand(blind, BN_num_bits(order) - 1, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY,
+ BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
+ goto err;
+ } while (BN_is_zero(blind));
+ BN_set_flags(blind, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(blindm, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+ BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+ /* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, priv_key, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
- if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, m, order)) {
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
+ /* blindm := blind * m mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod order */
+ if (!BN_mod_add_quick(s, tmp, blindm, order)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* s:= s * blind^-1 mod order */
+ if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, order, ctx) == NULL) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, blind, order, ctx)) {
+ ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* s := s * k^-1 mod order */
if (!BN_mod_mul(s, s, ckinv, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_OSSL_ECDSA_SIGN_SIG, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+
if (BN_is_zero(s)) {
/*
* if kinv and r have been supplied by the caller don't to
@@ -317,9 +374,8 @@ ECDSA_SIG *ossl_ecdsa_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- BN_clear_free(m);
- BN_clear_free(tmp);
BN_clear_free(kinv);
return ret;
}
--
2.17.1

50
gnu/packages/patches/openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch
View File

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2018-0732:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-0732
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4
From ea7abeeabf92b7aca160bdd0208636d4da69f4f4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation.
CVE-2018-0732
Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe)
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
---
crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index fce9ff47f3..58003d7087 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -78,10 +78,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
unsigned l;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
+ DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
--
2.17.1

10
gnu/packages/tls.scm
View File

@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ required structures.")
(package
(inherit openssl)
(name "openssl")
(version "1.1.0h")
(version "1.1.0i")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (list (string-append "https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-"
@ -420,14 +420,12 @@ required structures.")
(string-append "ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/old/"
(string-trim-right version char-set:letter)
"/" name "-" version ".tar.gz")))
(patches (search-patches "openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch"
"openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0495.patch"
"openssl-1.1.0-CVE-2018-0732.patch"))
(patches (search-patches "openssl-1.1.0-c-rehash-in.patch"))
(sha256
(base32
"05x509lccqjscgyi935z809pwfm708islypwhmjnb6cyvrn64daq"))))
"16fgaf113p6s5ixw227sycvihh3zx6f6rf0hvjjhxk68m12cigzb"))))
(outputs '("out"
"doc" ;1.3MiB of man3 pages
"doc" ; 1.3MiB of man3 pages
"static")) ; 5.5MiB of .a files
(arguments
(substitute-keyword-arguments (package-arguments openssl)