gnu: libarchive: Update to 3.2.2.
* gnu/packages/backup.scm (libarchive): Update to 3.2.2. [source]: Remove obsolete patches. * gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-7zip-heap-overflow.patch, gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-fix-filesystem-attacks.patch, gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-fix-symlink-check.patch, gnu/packages/patches/libarchive-safe_fprintf-buffer-overflow.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
This commit is contained in:
Leo Famulari
parent
e673a1df29
commit
f265a3cee5
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@ -647,10 +647,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/liba52-link-with-libm.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/liba52-set-soname.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/liba52-use-mtune-not-mcpu.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libarchive-7zip-heap-overflow.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libarchive-fix-symlink-check.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libarchive-fix-filesystem-attacks.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libarchive-safe_fprintf-buffer-overflow.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libbonobo-activation-test-race.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libcanberra-sound-theme-freedesktop.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/libcmis-fix-test-onedrive.patch \
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@ -172,20 +172,15 @@ backups (called chunks) to allow easy burning to CD/DVD.")
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(define-public libarchive
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(package
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(name "libarchive")
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(version "3.2.1")
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(version "3.2.2")
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(source
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(origin
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(method url-fetch)
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(uri (string-append "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-"
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version ".tar.gz"))
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(patches (search-patches
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"libarchive-7zip-heap-overflow.patch"
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"libarchive-fix-symlink-check.patch"
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"libarchive-fix-filesystem-attacks.patch"
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"libarchive-safe_fprintf-buffer-overflow.patch"))
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(sha256
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(base32
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"1lngng84k1kkljl74q0cdqc3s82vn2kimfm02dgm4d6m7x71mvkj"))))
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"03q6y428rg723c9fj1vidzjw46w1vf8z0h95lkvz1l9jw571j739"))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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;; TODO: Add -L/path/to/nettle in libarchive.pc.
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(inputs
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@ -1,77 +0,0 @@
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Fix buffer overflow reading 7Zip files:
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https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/761
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Patch copied from upstream repository:
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https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/7f17c791dcfd8c0416e2cd2485b19410e47ef126
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From 7f17c791dcfd8c0416e2cd2485b19410e47ef126 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
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Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 18:14:58 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] Issue 761: Heap overflow reading corrupted 7Zip files
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The sample file that demonstrated this had multiple 'EmptyStream'
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attributes. The first one ended up being used to calculate
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certain statistics, then was overwritten by the second which
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was incompatible with those statistics.
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The fix here is to reject any header with multiple EmptyStream
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attributes. While here, also reject headers with multiple
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EmptyFile, AntiFile, Name, or Attributes markers.
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---
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libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c | 10 ++++++++++
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1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
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index 1dfe52b..c0a536c 100644
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--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
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+++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_7zip.c
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@@ -2431,6 +2431,8 @@ read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
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switch (type) {
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case kEmptyStream:
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+ if (h->emptyStreamBools != NULL)
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+ return (-1);
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h->emptyStreamBools = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles,
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sizeof(*h->emptyStreamBools));
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if (h->emptyStreamBools == NULL)
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@@ -2451,6 +2453,8 @@ read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
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return (-1);
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break;
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}
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+ if (h->emptyFileBools != NULL)
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+ return (-1);
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h->emptyFileBools = calloc(empty_streams,
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sizeof(*h->emptyFileBools));
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if (h->emptyFileBools == NULL)
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@@ -2465,6 +2469,8 @@ read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
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return (-1);
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break;
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}
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+ if (h->antiBools != NULL)
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+ return (-1);
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h->antiBools = calloc(empty_streams,
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sizeof(*h->antiBools));
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if (h->antiBools == NULL)
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@@ -2491,6 +2497,8 @@ read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
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if ((ll & 1) || ll < zip->numFiles * 4)
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return (-1);
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+ if (zip->entry_names != NULL)
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+ return (-1);
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zip->entry_names = malloc(ll);
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if (zip->entry_names == NULL)
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return (-1);
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@@ -2543,6 +2551,8 @@ read_Header(struct archive_read *a, struct _7z_header_info *h,
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if ((p = header_bytes(a, 2)) == NULL)
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return (-1);
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allAreDefined = *p;
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+ if (h->attrBools != NULL)
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+ return (-1);
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h->attrBools = calloc((size_t)zip->numFiles,
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sizeof(*h->attrBools));
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if (h->attrBools == NULL)
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--
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2.10.0
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@ -1,445 +0,0 @@
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This patch fixes two bugs that allow attackers to overwrite or change
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the permissions of arbitrary files:
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https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/745
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https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/746
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Patch copied from upstream repository:
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https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/dfd6b54ce33960e420fb206d8872fb759b577ad9
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From dfd6b54ce33960e420fb206d8872fb759b577ad9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
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Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2016 13:21:57 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] Fixes for Issue #745 and Issue #746 from Doran Moppert.
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---
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libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c | 294 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 227 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
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index 8f0421e..abe1a86 100644
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--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
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+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
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@@ -326,12 +326,14 @@ struct archive_write_disk {
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#define HFS_BLOCKS(s) ((s) >> 12)
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+static int check_symlinks_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags);
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static int check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *);
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static int create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *);
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static struct fixup_entry *current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *, const char *pathname);
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#if defined(HAVE_FCHDIR) && defined(PATH_MAX)
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static void edit_deep_directories(struct archive_write_disk *ad);
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#endif
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+static int cleanup_pathname_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags);
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static int cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *);
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static int create_dir(struct archive_write_disk *, char *);
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static int create_parent_dir(struct archive_write_disk *, char *);
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@@ -2014,6 +2016,10 @@ create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
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const char *linkname;
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mode_t final_mode, mode;
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int r;
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+ /* these for check_symlinks_fsobj */
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+ char *linkname_copy; /* non-const copy of linkname */
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+ struct archive_string error_string;
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+ int error_number;
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/* We identify hard/symlinks according to the link names. */
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/* Since link(2) and symlink(2) don't handle modes, we're done here. */
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@@ -2022,6 +2028,27 @@ create_filesystem_object(struct archive_write_disk *a)
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#if !HAVE_LINK
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return (EPERM);
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#else
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+ archive_string_init(&error_string);
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+ linkname_copy = strdup(linkname);
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+ if (linkname_copy == NULL) {
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+ return (EPERM);
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+ }
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+ /* TODO: consider using the cleaned-up path as the link target? */
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+ r = cleanup_pathname_fsobj(linkname_copy, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
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+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
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+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
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+ free(linkname_copy);
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+ /* EPERM is more appropriate than error_number for our callers */
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+ return (EPERM);
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+ }
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+ r = check_symlinks_fsobj(linkname_copy, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
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+ if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
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+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
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+ free(linkname_copy);
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+ /* EPERM is more appropriate than error_number for our callers */
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+ return (EPERM);
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+ }
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+ free(linkname_copy);
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r = link(linkname, a->name) ? errno : 0;
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/*
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* New cpio and pax formats allow hardlink entries
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@@ -2362,115 +2389,228 @@ current_fixup(struct archive_write_disk *a, const char *pathname)
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* recent paths.
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*/
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/* TODO: Extend this to support symlinks on Windows Vista and later. */
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+
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+/*
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+ * Checks the given path to see if any elements along it are symlinks. Returns
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+ * ARCHIVE_OK if there are none, otherwise puts an error in errmsg.
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+ */
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static int
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-check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
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+check_symlinks_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags)
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{
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#if !defined(HAVE_LSTAT)
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/* Platform doesn't have lstat, so we can't look for symlinks. */
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(void)a; /* UNUSED */
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+ (void)path; /* UNUSED */
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+ (void)error_number; /* UNUSED */
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+ (void)error_string; /* UNUSED */
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+ (void)flags; /* UNUSED */
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return (ARCHIVE_OK);
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#else
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- char *pn;
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+ int res = ARCHIVE_OK;
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+ char *tail;
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+ char *head;
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+ int last;
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char c;
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int r;
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struct stat st;
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+ int restore_pwd;
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+
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+ /* Nothing to do here if name is empty */
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+ if(path[0] == '\0')
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+ return (ARCHIVE_OK);
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/*
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* Guard against symlink tricks. Reject any archive entry whose
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* destination would be altered by a symlink.
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+ *
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+ * Walk the filename in chunks separated by '/'. For each segment:
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+ * - if it doesn't exist, continue
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+ * - if it's symlink, abort or remove it
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+ * - if it's a directory and it's not the last chunk, cd into it
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+ * As we go:
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+ * head points to the current (relative) path
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+ * tail points to the temporary \0 terminating the segment we're currently examining
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+ * c holds what used to be in *tail
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+ * last is 1 if this is the last tail
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*/
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- /* Whatever we checked last time doesn't need to be re-checked. */
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- pn = a->name;
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- if (archive_strlen(&(a->path_safe)) > 0) {
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- char *p = a->path_safe.s;
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- while ((*pn != '\0') && (*p == *pn))
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- ++p, ++pn;
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- }
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+ restore_pwd = open(".", O_RDONLY | O_BINARY | O_CLOEXEC);
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+ __archive_ensure_cloexec_flag(restore_pwd);
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+ if (restore_pwd < 0)
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+ return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
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+ head = path;
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+ tail = path;
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+ last = 0;
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+ /* TODO: reintroduce a safe cache here? */
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/* Skip the root directory if the path is absolute. */
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- if(pn == a->name && pn[0] == '/')
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- ++pn;
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- c = pn[0];
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- /* Keep going until we've checked the entire name. */
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- while (pn[0] != '\0' && (pn[0] != '/' || pn[1] != '\0')) {
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+ if(tail == path && tail[0] == '/')
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+ ++tail;
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+ /* Keep going until we've checked the entire name.
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+ * head, tail, path all alias the same string, which is
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+ * temporarily zeroed at tail, so be careful restoring the
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+ * stashed (c=tail[0]) for error messages.
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+ * Exiting the loop with break is okay; continue is not.
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+ */
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+ while (!last) {
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+ /* Skip the separator we just consumed, plus any adjacent ones */
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+ while (*tail == '/')
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+ ++tail;
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/* Skip the next path element. */
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- while (*pn != '\0' && *pn != '/')
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- ++pn;
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- c = pn[0];
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- pn[0] = '\0';
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+ while (*tail != '\0' && *tail != '/')
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+ ++tail;
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+ /* is this the last path component? */
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+ last = (tail[0] == '\0') || (tail[0] == '/' && tail[1] == '\0');
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+ /* temporarily truncate the string here */
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+ c = tail[0];
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+ tail[0] = '\0';
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/* Check that we haven't hit a symlink. */
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- r = lstat(a->name, &st);
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+ r = lstat(head, &st);
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if (r != 0) {
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+ tail[0] = c;
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/* We've hit a dir that doesn't exist; stop now. */
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if (errno == ENOENT) {
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break;
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} else {
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- /* Note: This effectively disables deep directory
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+ /* Treat any other error as fatal - best to be paranoid here
|
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+ * Note: This effectively disables deep directory
|
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* support when security checks are enabled.
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* Otherwise, very long pathnames that trigger
|
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* an error here could evade the sandbox.
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* TODO: We could do better, but it would probably
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* require merging the symlink checks with the
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* deep-directory editing. */
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- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
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+ if (error_number) *error_number = errno;
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+ if (error_string)
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+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
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+ "Could not stat %s",
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+ path);
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+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ } else if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
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+ if (!last) {
|
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+ if (chdir(head) != 0) {
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+ tail[0] = c;
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+ if (error_number) *error_number = errno;
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+ if (error_string)
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+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
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+ "Could not chdir %s",
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+ path);
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+ res = (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
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+ break;
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+ }
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||||
+ /* Our view is now from inside this dir: */
|
||||
+ head = tail + 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
|
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- if (c == '\0') {
|
||||
+ if (last) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Last element is symlink; remove it
|
||||
* so we can overwrite it with the
|
||||
* item being extracted.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (unlink(a->name)) {
|
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- archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno,
|
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- "Could not remove symlink %s",
|
||||
- a->name);
|
||||
- pn[0] = c;
|
||||
- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
+ if (unlink(head)) {
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = errno;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Could not remove symlink %s",
|
||||
+ path);
|
||||
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- a->pst = NULL;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Even if we did remove it, a warning
|
||||
* is in order. The warning is silly,
|
||||
* though, if we're just replacing one
|
||||
* symlink with another symlink.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (!S_ISLNK(a->mode)) {
|
||||
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
|
||||
- "Removing symlink %s",
|
||||
- a->name);
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
+ /* FIXME: not sure how important this is to restore
|
||||
+ if (!S_ISLNK(path)) {
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = 0;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Removing symlink %s",
|
||||
+ path);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
/* Symlink gone. No more problem! */
|
||||
- pn[0] = c;
|
||||
- return (0);
|
||||
- } else if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
|
||||
+ res = ARCHIVE_OK;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ } else if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_UNLINK) {
|
||||
/* User asked us to remove problems. */
|
||||
- if (unlink(a->name) != 0) {
|
||||
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
|
||||
- "Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
|
||||
- a->name);
|
||||
- pn[0] = c;
|
||||
- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
+ if (unlink(head) != 0) {
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = 0;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Cannot remove intervening symlink %s",
|
||||
+ path);
|
||||
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- a->pst = NULL;
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, 0,
|
||||
- "Cannot extract through symlink %s",
|
||||
- a->name);
|
||||
- pn[0] = c;
|
||||
- return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = 0;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Cannot extract through symlink %s",
|
||||
+ path);
|
||||
+ res = ARCHIVE_FAILED;
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
- pn[0] = c;
|
||||
- if (pn[0] != '\0')
|
||||
- pn++; /* Advance to the next segment. */
|
||||
+ /* be sure to always maintain this */
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
+ if (tail[0] != '\0')
|
||||
+ tail++; /* Advance to the next segment. */
|
||||
}
|
||||
- pn[0] = c;
|
||||
- /* We've checked and/or cleaned the whole path, so remember it. */
|
||||
- archive_strcpy(&a->path_safe, a->name);
|
||||
- return (ARCHIVE_OK);
|
||||
+ /* Catches loop exits via break */
|
||||
+ tail[0] = c;
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHDIR
|
||||
+ /* If we changed directory above, restore it here. */
|
||||
+ if (restore_pwd >= 0) {
|
||||
+ r = fchdir(restore_pwd);
|
||||
+ if (r != 0) {
|
||||
+ if(error_number) *error_number = errno;
|
||||
+ if(error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "chdir() failure");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ close(restore_pwd);
|
||||
+ restore_pwd = -1;
|
||||
+ if (r != 0) {
|
||||
+ res = (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+ /* TODO: reintroduce a safe cache here? */
|
||||
+ return res;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+/*
|
||||
+ * Check a->name for symlinks, returning ARCHIVE_OK if its clean, otherwise
|
||||
+ * calls archive_set_error and returns ARCHIVE_{FATAL,FAILED}
|
||||
+ */
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct archive_string error_string;
|
||||
+ int error_number;
|
||||
+ int rc;
|
||||
+ archive_string_init(&error_string);
|
||||
+ rc = check_symlinks_fsobj(a->name, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
|
||||
+ if (rc != ARCHIVE_OK) {
|
||||
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ archive_string_free(&error_string);
|
||||
+ a->pst = NULL; /* to be safe */
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
#if defined(__CYGWIN__)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* 1. Convert a path separator from '\' to '/' .
|
||||
@@ -2544,15 +2684,17 @@ cleanup_pathname_win(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
* is set) if the path is absolute.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int
|
||||
-cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
+cleanup_pathname_fsobj(char *path, int *error_number, struct archive_string *error_string, int flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
char *dest, *src;
|
||||
char separator = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
- dest = src = a->name;
|
||||
+ dest = src = path;
|
||||
if (*src == '\0') {
|
||||
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
|
||||
- "Invalid empty pathname");
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Invalid empty pathname");
|
||||
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2561,9 +2703,11 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
/* Skip leading '/'. */
|
||||
if (*src == '/') {
|
||||
- if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
|
||||
- archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
|
||||
- "Path is absolute");
|
||||
+ if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NOABSOLUTEPATHS) {
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Path is absolute");
|
||||
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2590,10 +2734,11 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
} else if (src[1] == '.') {
|
||||
if (src[2] == '/' || src[2] == '\0') {
|
||||
/* Conditionally warn about '..' */
|
||||
- if (a->flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
|
||||
- archive_set_error(&a->archive,
|
||||
- ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC,
|
||||
- "Path contains '..'");
|
||||
+ if (flags & ARCHIVE_EXTRACT_SECURE_NODOTDOT) {
|
||||
+ if (error_number) *error_number = ARCHIVE_ERRNO_MISC;
|
||||
+ if (error_string)
|
||||
+ archive_string_sprintf(error_string,
|
||||
+ "Path contains '..'");
|
||||
return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2624,7 +2769,7 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
* We've just copied zero or more path elements, not including the
|
||||
* final '/'.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
- if (dest == a->name) {
|
||||
+ if (dest == path) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Nothing got copied. The path must have been something
|
||||
* like '.' or '/' or './' or '/././././/./'.
|
||||
@@ -2639,6 +2784,21 @@ cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static int
|
||||
+cleanup_pathname(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ struct archive_string error_string;
|
||||
+ int error_number;
|
||||
+ int rc;
|
||||
+ archive_string_init(&error_string);
|
||||
+ rc = cleanup_pathname_fsobj(a->name, &error_number, &error_string, a->flags);
|
||||
+ if (rc != ARCHIVE_OK) {
|
||||
+ archive_set_error(&a->archive, error_number, "%s", error_string.s);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ archive_string_free(&error_string);
|
||||
+ return rc;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Create the parent directory of the specified path, assuming path
|
||||
* is already in mutable storage.
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
|||
Make sure to check for symlinks even if the pathname is very long:
|
||||
|
||||
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/744
|
||||
|
||||
Patch copied from upstream repository:
|
||||
|
||||
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/1fa9c7bf90f0862036a99896b0501c381584451a
|
||||
|
||||
From 1fa9c7bf90f0862036a99896b0501c381584451a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2016 17:11:45 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Issue #744 (part of Issue #743): Enforce sandbox with very
|
||||
long pathnames
|
||||
|
||||
Because check_symlinks is handled separately from the deep-directory
|
||||
support, very long pathnames cause problems. Previously, the code
|
||||
ignored most failures to lstat() a path component. In particular,
|
||||
this led to check_symlinks always passing for very long paths, which
|
||||
in turn provides a way to evade the symlink checks in the sandboxing
|
||||
code.
|
||||
|
||||
We now fail on unrecognized lstat() failures, which plugs this
|
||||
hole at the cost of disabling deep directory support when the
|
||||
user requests sandboxing.
|
||||
|
||||
TODO: This probably cannot be completely fixed without
|
||||
entirely reimplementing the deep directory support to
|
||||
integrate the symlink checks. I want to reimplement the
|
||||
deep directory hanlding someday anyway; openat() and
|
||||
related system calls now provide a much cleaner way to
|
||||
handle deep directories than the chdir approach used by this
|
||||
code.
|
||||
---
|
||||
libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c | 12 +++++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
|
||||
index 39ee3b6..8f0421e 100644
|
||||
--- a/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
|
||||
+++ b/libarchive/archive_write_disk_posix.c
|
||||
@@ -2401,8 +2401,18 @@ check_symlinks(struct archive_write_disk *a)
|
||||
r = lstat(a->name, &st);
|
||||
if (r != 0) {
|
||||
/* We've hit a dir that doesn't exist; stop now. */
|
||||
- if (errno == ENOENT)
|
||||
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ /* Note: This effectively disables deep directory
|
||||
+ * support when security checks are enabled.
|
||||
+ * Otherwise, very long pathnames that trigger
|
||||
+ * an error here could evade the sandbox.
|
||||
+ * TODO: We could do better, but it would probably
|
||||
+ * require merging the symlink checks with the
|
||||
+ * deep-directory editing. */
|
||||
+ return (ARCHIVE_FAILED);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
} else if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
|
||||
if (c == '\0') {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
|
|||
Fixes this buffer overflow:
|
||||
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/issues/767
|
||||
|
||||
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
|
||||
https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/e37b620fe8f14535d737e89a4dcabaed4517bf1a
|
||||
|
||||
From e37b620fe8f14535d737e89a4dcabaed4517bf1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Tim Kientzle <kientzle@acm.org>
|
||||
Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2016 10:51:43 -0700
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Issue #767: Buffer overflow printing a filename
|
||||
|
||||
The safe_fprintf function attempts to ensure clean output for an
|
||||
arbitrary sequence of bytes by doing a trial conversion of the
|
||||
multibyte characters to wide characters -- if the resulting wide
|
||||
character is printable then we pass through the corresponding bytes
|
||||
unaltered, otherwise, we convert them to C-style ASCII escapes.
|
||||
|
||||
The stack trace in Issue #767 suggest that the 20-byte buffer
|
||||
was getting overflowed trying to format a non-printable multibyte
|
||||
character. This should only happen if there is a valid multibyte
|
||||
character of more than 5 bytes that was unprintable. (Each byte
|
||||
would get expanded to a four-charcter octal-style escape of the form
|
||||
"\123" resulting in >20 characters for the >5 byte multibyte character.)
|
||||
|
||||
I've not been able to reproduce this, but have expanded the conversion
|
||||
buffer to 128 bytes on the belief that no multibyte character set
|
||||
has a single character of more than 32 bytes.
|
||||
---
|
||||
tar/util.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/tar/util.c b/tar/util.c
|
||||
index 9ff22f2..2b4aebe 100644
|
||||
--- a/tar/util.c
|
||||
+++ b/tar/util.c
|
||||
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ safe_fprintf(FILE *f, const char *fmt, ...)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If our output buffer is full, dump it and keep going. */
|
||||
- if (i > (sizeof(outbuff) - 20)) {
|
||||
+ if (i > (sizeof(outbuff) - 128)) {
|
||||
outbuff[i] = '\0';
|
||||
fprintf(f, "%s", outbuff);
|
||||
i = 0;
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue