gnu: qemu: Update to 2.8.1 [security fixes].

Fixes CVE-2016-{9602,9603} and CVE-2017-{2615,2620,2630,5667,5931}.

* gnu/packages/qemu.scm (qemu): Update to 2.8.1.
* gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch,
gnu/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch: Delete files.
* gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them.
This commit is contained in:
Leo Famulari 2017-04-07 00:16:18 -04:00
parent 0715c0e69c
commit fbd6fb1a9d
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 2646FA30BACA7F08
7 changed files with 4 additions and 347 deletions

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@ -890,18 +890,13 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
%D%/packages/patches/python-pygpgme-fix-pinentry-tests.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/python2-subprocess32-disable-input-test.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2016-10155.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5525.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5526.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5552.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5578.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5579.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/qt4-ldflags.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/quickswitch-fix-dmenu-check.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rapicorn-isnan.patch \

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@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
http://git.qemu.org/?p=qemu.git;a=patch;h=62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64
this patch is from qemu-git.
From 62d4c6bd5263bb8413a06c80144fc678df6dfb64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2017 09:35:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: fix oob access issue (CVE-2017-2615)
When doing bitblt copy in backward mode, we should minus the
blt width first just like the adding in the forward mode. This
can avoid the oob access of the front of vga's vram.
Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
{ kraxel: with backward blits (negative pitch) addr is the topmost
address, so check it as-is against vram size ]
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Cc: P J P <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Fixes: d3532a0db02296e687711b8cdc7791924efccea0 (CVE-2014-8106)
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Message-id: 1485938101-26602-1-git-send-email-kraxel@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
---
hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
index 7db6409dc5..16f27e8ac5 100644
--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
@@ -274,10 +274,9 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
{
if (pitch < 0) {
int64_t min = addr
- + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height-1) * pitch;
- int32_t max = addr
- + s->cirrus_blt_width;
- if (min < 0 || max > s->vga.vram_size) {
+ + ((int64_t)s->cirrus_blt_height - 1) * pitch
+ - s->cirrus_blt_width;
+ if (min < -1 || addr >= s->vga.vram_size) {
return true;
}
} else {
--
2.11.0

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@ -1,134 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-2620:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2620
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg04700.html
Both patches copied from upstream source repository:
Fixes CVE-2017-2620:
http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298
The CVE-2017-2620 bug-fix depends on this earlier patch:
http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061
From 92f2b88cea48c6aeba8de568a45f2ed958f3c298 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2017 11:18:36 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] cirrus: add blit_is_unsafe call to cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo
(CVE-2017-2620)
CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC blits do NOT check blit destination
and blit width, at all. Oops. Fix it.
Security impact: high.
The missing blit destination check allows to write to host memory.
Basically same as CVE-2014-8106 for the other blit variants.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
index 1deb52070a..b9e7cb1df1 100644
--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
@@ -900,6 +900,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
int w;
+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
s->cirrus_blt_mode &= ~CIRRUS_BLTMODE_MEMSYSSRC;
s->cirrus_srcptr = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
s->cirrus_srcptr_end = &s->cirrus_bltbuf[0];
@@ -925,6 +929,10 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_cputovideo(CirrusVGAState * s)
}
s->cirrus_srccounter = s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch * s->cirrus_blt_height;
}
+
+ /* the blit_is_unsafe call above should catch this */
+ assert(s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch <= CIRRUS_BLTBUFSIZE);
+
s->cirrus_srcptr = s->cirrus_bltbuf;
s->cirrus_srcptr_end = s->cirrus_bltbuf + s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch;
cirrus_update_memory_access(s);
--
2.12.0
From 913a87885f589d263e682c2eb6637c6e14538061 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 13:35:20 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] display: cirrus: ignore source pitch value as needed in
blit_is_unsafe
Commit 4299b90 added a check which is too broad, given that the source
pitch value is not required to be initialized for solid fill operations.
This patch refines the blit_is_unsafe() check to ignore source pitch in
that case. After applying the above commit as a security patch, we
noticed the SLES 11 SP4 guest gui failed to initialize properly.
Signed-off-by: Bruce Rogers <brogers@suse.com>
Message-id: 20170109203520.5619-1-brogers@suse.com
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
---
hw/display/cirrus_vga.c | 11 +++++++----
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
index bdb092ee9d..379910db2d 100644
--- a/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
+++ b/hw/display/cirrus_vga.c
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static bool blit_region_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s,
return false;
}
-static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
+static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s, bool dst_only)
{
/* should be the case, see cirrus_bitblt_start */
assert(s->cirrus_blt_width > 0);
@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ static bool blit_is_unsafe(struct CirrusVGAState *s)
s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
}
+ if (dst_only) {
+ return false;
+ }
if (blit_region_is_unsafe(s, s->cirrus_blt_srcpitch,
s->cirrus_blt_srcaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask)) {
return true;
@@ -673,7 +676,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_common_patterncopy(CirrusVGAState * s,
dst = s->vga.vram_ptr + (s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr & s->cirrus_addr_mask);
- if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
return 0;
(*s->cirrus_rop) (s, dst, src,
@@ -691,7 +694,7 @@ static int cirrus_bitblt_solidfill(CirrusVGAState *s, int blt_rop)
{
cirrus_fill_t rop_func;
- if (blit_is_unsafe(s)) {
+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, true)) {
return 0;
}
rop_func = cirrus_fill[rop_to_index[blt_rop]][s->cirrus_blt_pixelwidth - 1];
@@ -795,7 +798,7 @@ static int cirrus_do_copy(CirrusVGAState *s, int dst, int src, int w, int h)
static int cirrus_bitblt_videotovideo_copy(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
- if (blit_is_unsafe(s))
+ if (blit_is_unsafe(s, false))
return 0;
return cirrus_do_copy(s, s->cirrus_blt_dstaddr - s->vga.start_addr,
--
2.12.0

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@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-2630:
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-2630
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/qemu-devel/2017-02/msg01246.html
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=2563c9c6b8670400c48e562034b321a7cf3d9a85
From 2563c9c6b8670400c48e562034b321a7cf3d9a85 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2017 09:16:27 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] nbd/client: fix drop_sync [CVE-2017-2630]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Comparison symbol is misused. It may lead to memory corruption.
Introduced in commit 7d3123e.
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
Message-Id: <20170203154757.36140-6-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com>
[eblake: add CVE details, update conditional]
Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20170307151627.27212-1-eblake@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
nbd/client.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/nbd/client.c b/nbd/client.c
index 5c9dee37fa..3dc2564cd0 100644
--- a/nbd/client.c
+++ b/nbd/client.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static ssize_t drop_sync(QIOChannel *ioc, size_t size)
char small[1024];
char *buffer;
- buffer = sizeof(small) < size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
+ buffer = sizeof(small) >= size ? small : g_malloc(MIN(65536, size));
while (size > 0) {
ssize_t count = read_sync(ioc, buffer, MIN(65536, size));
--
2.12.0

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@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-5667 (sdhci OOB access during multi block SDMA transfer):
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/243
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5667
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commitdiff;h=42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9
From 42922105beb14c2fc58185ea022b9f72fb5465e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 18:29:59 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] sd: sdhci: check data length during dma_memory_read
While doing multi block SDMA transfer in routine
'sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks', the 's->fifo_buffer' starting
index 'begin' and data length 's->data_count' could end up to be same.
This could lead to an OOB access issue. Correct transfer data length
to avoid it.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Jiang Xin <jiangxin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Prasad J Pandit <pjp@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 20170130064736.9236-1-ppandit@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
---
hw/sd/sdhci.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/hw/sd/sdhci.c b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
index 01fbf228be..5bd5ab6319 100644
--- a/hw/sd/sdhci.c
+++ b/hw/sd/sdhci.c
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static void sdhci_sdma_transfer_multi_blocks(SDHCIState *s)
boundary_count -= block_size - begin;
}
dma_memory_read(&address_space_memory, s->sdmasysad,
- &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count);
+ &s->fifo_buffer[begin], s->data_count - begin);
s->sdmasysad += s->data_count - begin;
if (s->data_count == block_size) {
for (n = 0; n < block_size; n++) {
--
2.11.1

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@ -1,55 +0,0 @@
Fix CVE-2017-5931 (integer overflow in handling virtio-crypto requests):
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q1/337
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-5931
Patch copied from upstream source repository:
http://git.qemu-project.org/?p=qemu.git;a=commit;h=a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4
From a08aaff811fb194950f79711d2afe5a892ae03a4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Date: Tue, 3 Jan 2017 14:50:03 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] virtio-crypto: fix possible integer and heap overflow
Because the 'size_t' type is 4 bytes in 32-bit platform, which
is the same with 'int'. It's easy to make 'max_len' to zero when
integer overflow and then cause heap overflow if 'max_len' is zero.
Using uint_64 instead of size_t to avoid the integer overflow.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reported-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Li Qiang <liqiang6-s@360.cn>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---
hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
index 2f2467e859..c23e1ad458 100644
--- a/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
+++ b/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c
@@ -416,7 +416,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
uint32_t hash_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_hash = 0;
uint32_t cipher_start_src_offset = 0, len_to_cipher = 0;
- size_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
+ uint64_t max_len, curr_size = 0;
size_t s;
/* Plain cipher */
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ virtio_crypto_sym_op_helper(VirtIODevice *vdev,
return NULL;
}
- max_len = iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
+ max_len = (uint64_t)iv_len + aad_len + src_len + dst_len + hash_result_len;
if (unlikely(max_len > vcrypto->conf.max_size)) {
virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-crypto too big length");
return NULL;
--
2.11.1

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@ -69,27 +69,23 @@
(define-public qemu
(package
(name "qemu")
(version "2.8.0")
(version "2.8.1")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append "http://wiki.qemu-project.org/download/qemu-"
version ".tar.bz2"))
version ".tar.xz"))
(sha256
(base32
"0qjy3rcrn89n42y5iz60kgr0rrl29hpnj8mq2yvbc1wrcizmvzfs"))
"0h342v4n44kh89yyfas4iazvhhsy5m5qk94vsjqpz5zpq1i2ykad"))
(patches (search-patches "qemu-CVE-2016-10155.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-2615.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-2620.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-2630.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5525.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5526.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5552.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5578.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5579.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5667.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5856.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5898.patch"
"qemu-CVE-2017-5931.patch"))))
))))
(build-system gnu-build-system)
(arguments
'(;; Running tests in parallel can occasionally lead to failures, like: