gnu: wpa-supplicant: Update to 2.6.
* gnu/packages/admin.scm (wpa-supplicant-minimal)[source]: Update to 2.6. Remove 'patches' field. * gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch, gnu/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch: Delete files. * gnu/local.mk (dist_patch_DATA): Remove them. Signed-off-by: Leo Famulari <leo@famulari.name>
This commit is contained in:
Marius Bakke
Leo Famulari
parent
6f9d5b2e8c
commit
fc0081213d
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@ -896,15 +896,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA = \
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%D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-2149.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt1.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wordnet-CVE-2008-3908-pt2.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/xdotool-fix-makefile.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ark-remove-mibstore.patch \
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%D%/packages/patches/xf86-video-ast-remove-mibstore.patch \
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@ -862,7 +862,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
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(define-public wpa-supplicant-minimal
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(package
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(name "wpa-supplicant-minimal")
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(version "2.5")
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(version "2.6")
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(source (origin
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(method url-fetch)
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(uri (string-append
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@ -871,17 +871,7 @@ commands and their arguments.")
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".tar.gz"))
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(sha256
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(base32
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"05mkp5bx1c3z7h5biddsv0p49gkrq9ksany3anp4wdiv92p5prfc"))
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(patches
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(search-patches "wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5310.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5314.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5315.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2015-5316.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4476.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt1.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt2.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt3.patch"
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"wpa-supplicant-CVE-2016-4477-pt4.patch"))))
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"0l0l5gz3d5j9bqjsbjlfcv4w4jwndllp9fmyai4x9kg6qhs6v4xl"))))
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(build-system gnu-build-system)
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(arguments
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'(#:phases (alist-replace
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@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
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From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
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PMF in use
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WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
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enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
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side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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index 954de67..7d79499 100644
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--- a/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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end = ptr + key_len_total;
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
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+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
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+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
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+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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while (ptr + 1 < end) {
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if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
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@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
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From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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index cb83ff7..9f787ab 100644
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--- a/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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/*
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* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
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"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
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@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
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(int) len);
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return;
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@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
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From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index 1f78544..75ceef1 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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/*
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* buffer and ACK the fragment
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
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@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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return NULL;
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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-
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
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EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
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EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
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@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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(int) len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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}
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
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From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
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If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
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exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
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data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
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did not take this corner case into account and could end up
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dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
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message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
|
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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index 75ceef1..892b590 100644
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--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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|
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fin:
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- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
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+ if (data->grp)
|
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+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
|
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BN_clear_free(x);
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BN_clear_free(y);
|
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if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
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--
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1.9.1
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|
@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
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From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
|
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
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|
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
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characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
|
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STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
|
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WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
|
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|
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This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
|
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the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
|
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an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
|
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such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
|
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could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
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---
|
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src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++
|
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src/utils/common.h | 1 +
|
||||
src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
|
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3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
|
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|
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diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
|
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index 450e2c6..27b7c02 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/utils/common.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/utils/common.c
|
||||
@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
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+{
|
||||
+ size_t i;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
|
||||
+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
|
||||
diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
|
||||
index 701dbb2..a972240 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/utils/common.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/utils/common.h
|
||||
@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
|
||||
|
||||
char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
|
||||
int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
||||
+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
||||
size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
|
||||
diff --git a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
|
||||
index eadb22f..e8c4579 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
|
||||
@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
|
||||
cred->key_len--;
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
|
||||
}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
|
||||
+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
|
||||
+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
|
||||
+ cred->key, cred->key_len);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
|
||||
character
|
||||
|
||||
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
|
||||
characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
|
||||
includes an invalid passphrase.
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
|
||||
configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
|
||||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
|
||||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
|
||||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
|
||||
does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
|
||||
wpa_supplicant.
|
||||
|
||||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
|
||||
almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
|
||||
file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
|
||||
opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
|
||||
load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
|
||||
This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
|
||||
wpa_supplicant process privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
index b1c7870..fdd9643 100644
|
||||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
|
||||
}
|
||||
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
|
||||
(u8 *) value, len);
|
||||
+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
|
||||
+ line);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
|
||||
os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
|
||||
/* No change to the previously configured value */
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network
|
||||
output
|
||||
|
||||
Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
|
||||
wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
|
||||
parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
|
||||
been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
|
||||
characters in the psk parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
||||
src/utils/common.h | 1 +
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
|
||||
3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/src/utils/common.c b/src/utils/common.c
|
||||
index 27b7c02..9856463 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/utils/common.c
|
||||
+++ b/src/utils/common.c
|
||||
@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+int has_newline(const char *str)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ while (*str) {
|
||||
+ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ str++;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
|
||||
diff --git a/src/utils/common.h b/src/utils/common.h
|
||||
index a972240..d19927b 100644
|
||||
--- a/src/utils/common.h
|
||||
+++ b/src/utils/common.h
|
||||
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
|
||||
char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
|
||||
int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
||||
int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
||||
+int has_newline(const char *str);
|
||||
size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
|
||||
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
index fdd9643..eb97cd5 100644
|
||||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var)
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) {
|
||||
const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i];
|
||||
- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
|
||||
- return field->writer(field, ssid);
|
||||
+ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
|
||||
+ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it",
|
||||
+ var);
|
||||
+ os_free(ret);
|
||||
+ ret = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
|
||||
string values
|
||||
|
||||
Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
|
||||
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
|
||||
unexpected configuration file data might be written.
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
|
||||
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
|
||||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
|
||||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
|
||||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
|
||||
does not validate the credential value before passing it to
|
||||
wpa_supplicant.
|
||||
|
||||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
|
||||
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
|
||||
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
|
||||
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
|
||||
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
|
||||
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
index eb97cd5..69152ef 100644
|
||||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
|
||||
|
||||
if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 &&
|
||||
os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (has_newline(value))
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
str_clear_free(cred->password);
|
||||
cred->password = os_strdup(value);
|
||||
cred->ext_password = 1;
|
||||
@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len);
|
||||
- if (val == NULL) {
|
||||
+ if (val == NULL ||
|
||||
+ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
|
||||
+ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
|
||||
+ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
|
||||
+ has_newline(val))) {
|
||||
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string "
|
||||
"value '%s'.", line, var, value);
|
||||
+ os_free(val);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
|
||||
string values
|
||||
|
||||
Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
|
||||
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
|
||||
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
|
||||
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
|
||||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
|
||||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
|
||||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
|
||||
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
|
||||
wpa_supplicant.
|
||||
|
||||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
|
||||
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
|
||||
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
|
||||
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
|
||||
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
|
||||
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/config.c b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
index 69152ef..d9a1603 100644
|
||||
--- a/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ b/wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (has_newline(pos)) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
|
||||
+ line, data->name);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
tmp = os_strdup(pos);
|
||||
if (tmp == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue